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THE LIMITS OF GLOBAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE
David S. Law* & Wen-Chen Chang**
Abstract: The notion that “global judicial dialogue” is contributing to the globalization of
constitutional law has attracted considerable attention. Various scholars have characterized
the citation of foreign law by constitutional courts as a form of “dialogue” that both reflects
and fosters the emergence of a common global enterprise of constitutional adjudication. It
has also been claimed that increasing direct interaction between judges, face-to-face or
otherwise, fuels the growth of a global constitutional jurisprudence.
This Article challenges these claims on empirical grounds and offers an alternative
account of the actual reasons for which constitutional courts engage in comparative analysis.
First, it is both conceptually and factually inaccurate to characterize the manner in which
constitutional courts cite and analyze foreign jurisprudence as a form of “dialogue.” As a
conceptual matter, constitutional courts do not cite one another for the purpose of
communicating with another, while as an empirical matter, there is little evidence to suggest
that one-sided citation of a handful of highly prestigious courts has given way to genuine
two-way dialogue. Second, judicial interaction is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause
of constitutional globalization. Rather, the effect of such interaction on the extent to which
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judges engage in comparativism is dwarfed by institutional and structural variables that lie
largely beyond judicial control.
The relative unimportance of judicial interaction is illustrated by a comparative case
study of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China (Taiwan), which is akin to a
natural experiment in the capacity of a constitutional court to make use of foreign law even
when it is largely deprived of contact with other courts. Taiwan’s precarious diplomatic
situation effectively precludes the members of its Constitutional Court from participating in
international judicial gatherings or visits to foreign courts. Nevertheless, the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court nearly always engages in extensive comparative constitutional analysis,
either expressly or implicitly, when rendering its decisions. To explain how and why the
Court makes use of foreign law notwithstanding its isolation, this Article combines
quantitative analysis of citations to foreign law in the Court’s published opinions with indepth interviews of numerous current and former members of the Court and their clerks.
Comparison of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court and U.S. Supreme Court demonstrates
that “global judicial dialogue” plays a much smaller role in shaping a court’s utilization of
foreign law than institutional factors such as (a) the rules and practices governing the
composition and staffing of the court and (b) the extent to which the structure of legal
education and the legal profession incentivizes judges and academics to possess expertise in
foreign law. Notwithstanding the fact that American justices enjoy unsurpassed opportunities
to interact with judges from other countries, comparative analysis plays a less frequent role in
their own constitutional jurisprudence than in that of their foreign counterparts. Openness on
the part of individual justices to foreign law ultimately cannot compensate for the fact that
the hiring and instructional practices of American law schools neither demand nor reward the
possession of foreign legal expertise.
This Article also documents the fact that judicial opinions are a highly misleading source
of data about judicial usage of foreign law. Interviews with members of the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court and their clerks reveal the existence of a large gap between the
frequency with which the court cites foreign law in its opinions and the extent to which it
actually considers foreign law. Analysis of judicial opinions alone may lead scholars to
conclude mistakenly that a court rarely engages in comparative analysis when, in fact, such
analysis is highly routine.
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INTRODUCTION: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?
No aspect of the globalization of constitutional law has thus far
attracted more attention or controversy than the use of foreign and
international legal materials by constitutional courts.1 Although judicial
citation of foreign law is hardly a new phenomenon, there is a
widespread sense that constitutional courts are turning more frequently
to foreign jurisprudence for guidance and inspiration.2 Moreover, the
manner in which courts and judges interact with one another has
changed in ways that are said to have systemic implications for the
global evolution of constitutional law. Prominent scholars and jurists
now speak in glowing terms of the emergence of a “global” or
“international” or “transnational judicial dialogue”3 that unites judges
1. For descriptions of the debate itself, see, for example, Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the
Debate on “Outsourcing Authority,” 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 656–64 (2006); David S. Law, Generic
Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 699–701 (2005); and Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a
Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A1. For examples
of scholarly criticism of the judicial use of foreign law in constitutional cases, see ROBERT H. BORK,
COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 22–25 (2003); JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW
WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 22–23
(2005); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J.
INT’L L. 57, 61–69 (2004); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL
AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 40–42; and Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 72–80 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 1, at A1; Antonin Scalia, Outsourcing American Law: Foreign
Law in Constitutional Interpretation 5 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 152, 2009), available
at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090820-Chapter2.pdf (lamenting that the citation of foreign law in
constitutional cases appears to be the “wave of the future”). But see David Zaring, The Use of
Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297,
299 (2006) (suggesting that “the Supreme Court uses less foreign law now than it has at any other
time in its history”).
3. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2004); Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the
Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 40 (1998); Michael Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue,
Internationalisation of Law, and Australian Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 171, 173–81 (2008); Basil
Markesinis & Jorg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11, 15–17 (2005); Melissa
Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating
and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 492 (2005); Katharine G. Young, The World,
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around the world in a “common global judicial enterprise.”4 It is said
that, by engaging in “open” and “self-conscious” debate with courts in
other countries over common questions of both substance and
methodology, constitutional courts not only “improve the quality of their
particular national decisions,” but also “contribute to a nascent global
jurisprudence,” most notably in the area of human rights.5
Several varieties of global judicial dialogue are said to exist. One
variety, which has already been mentioned, is comparative analysis of
the type found in judicial decisions. Although judicial citation of foreign
law is hardly a new phenomenon,6 it is increasingly suggested that the
manner in which constitutional courts analyze the work of their
counterparts in other countries is characterized by such a degree of
mutual engagement and substantive debate that it amounts to an ongoing
conversation conducted through the medium of judicial opinions.7 A
second variety of global judicial dialogue is dialogue in a literal sense, in
the form of “direct interactions”8 and networking among judges. This
type of dialogue has been fostered by technological advances, such as
the internet, that have lowered the barriers to international
communication, and by the deliberate efforts of academic institutions,
intergovernmental and international organizations, and constitutional
courts themselves to generate proliferating opportunities for face-to-face
Through the Judge’s Eye, 28 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 27, 31 (2009); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., “I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing (In Perfect Harmony)”: International Judicial Dialogue
and the Muses—Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1321, 1323 n.6, 1329 (2006) (reviewing various terms that scholars have used to
refer to the same phenomenon, and noting that “advocates” of “international judicial dialogue” “far
outnumber its critics”); Gerald Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 87 (2004) (identifying institutional reasons for the Supreme
Court to engage in “normative dialogue” with constitutional courts and human rights tribunals).
4. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99.
5. Id. at 70.
6. See, e.g., DAVID B. GOLDMAN, GLOBALISATION AND THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION:
RECURRING PATTERNS OF LAW AND AUTHORITY 125 (2007) (noting that the use of Continental law
by English judges and practitioners “increased markedly” from the fourteenth through sixteenth
centuries). Even the U.S. Supreme Court, which has acquired a reputation for not citing foreign law,
see Liptak, supra note 1, at A1; L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 37–38, has a long history of
citing foreign law that dates back to its creation. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson
Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 756–92 (2005) (cataloguing the
Court’s relatively frequent invocation of the “law of nations” and Roman law from the nation’s
founding through 1840).
7. See sources cited supra note 3.
8. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 70; see also, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 100 (2010) (pointing to the existence of “a body of
judicial ‘networks’” comprised of “constitutional court judges who communicate with each other
and meet at conferences and fora around the world”).
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interaction, in the form of conferences, visits, and the like.9
It is not the goal of this Article to contribute to the normative debate
over whether global judicial dialogue is cause for celebration or
consternation. Nor is it our purpose to evaluate the normative arguments
in favor of an interpretive posture of “engagement”10 or a “dialogical”
approach to comparative analysis.11 This Article aims, instead, to explain
as an empirical matter why the concept of “global judicial dialogue”
neither describes the actual practice of comparative analysis by judges
nor explains the emergence of a global constitutional jurisprudence. We
also demonstrate that the frequency with which a court cites foreign law
in its opinions is an extremely unreliable measure of the extent to which
the court actually makes use of foreign law. Scholars who wish to
understand or measure a particular court’s usage of foreign law must
therefore be prepared to supplement quantitative research methods, such
as statistical analysis of citations to foreign law, with qualitative
approaches that are capable of probing more deeply, such as interviews
with court personnel.
Part II of this Article argues that the notion of “dialogue” is, both
conceptually and empirically, an inapt metaphor for the comparative
analysis performed by constitutional courts. Part III takes advantage of a
natural experiment in judicial isolation to show that judge-to-judge
dialogue and “judicial networks,” as eye-catching as they may be, have
limited impact on constitutional adjudication and do little to explain the
frequency or sophistication with which constitutional judges resort to
foreign law. The natural experiment that we evaluate goes by the name
of Taiwan—a democratic country with an active constitutional court that
is nevertheless systematically deprived of opportunities to interact
directly with other courts for a combination of historical and political

9. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99; see, e.g., Kirby, supra note 3, at 179 (describing various
venues for transnational judicial dialogue, and observing that the process of “bring[ing] national
judges of many countries together to discuss issues in common . . . has now been under way for
decades”). A third variety of judicial dialogue, which is closely identified with the traditional
concept of judicial comity but is not at issue in this Article, consists of the dialogue in which courts
engage when overlapping jurisdiction forces them to address potential conflict over the resolution of
specific cases. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 65; Waters, supra note 3, at 180–81.
10. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 72; see id. at 98 (arguing that “[t]he force of [the idea of
independent judging], together with increases in institutional networks of judges and increased
communications among courts, promotes, in various ways, a willingness to consider and refer to
foreign and international legal materials . . . in a spirit of engagement”).
11. See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 833–41, 885–92 (1999) (contrasting
and evaluating “genealogical,” “universalist,” and “dialogical” modes of comparative constitutional
interpretation, and concluding that the “dialogical” mode best meets the demands of “scope” and
“legitimacy,” if not also “constitutional culture”).
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reasons. Our case study of Taiwan combines quantitative and qualitative
empirical research methods, in the form of statistical analysis of the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s decisions and numerous off-the-record
interviews with members of the Court and their law clerks. Although the
Court rarely cites foreign law, foreign legal research forms a routine and
indispensable part of its deliberations. Taiwan’s experience strongly
suggests that judicial interaction and networking play a much smaller
role in shaping a court’s utilization of foreign law than institutional
factors such as the rules and practices governing the composition and
staffing of the court and the extent to which the structure of legal
education and the legal profession incentivizes judges and academics to
possess expertise in foreign law. Comparison of the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court with the U.S. Supreme Court, which rarely looks to
foreign law for inspiration notwithstanding its extensive participation in
various forms of global judicial dialogue, only reinforces this
conclusion. This comparison is performed in Part IV. The Article
concludes by highlighting the role that American legal education must
play if the global influence of American constitutionalism is to be
revived, or if American courts are to engage in comparativism of their
own.
I.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: DIALOGUE OR MONOLOGUE?

Advocates of the global judicial dialogue thesis argue that the manner
in which courts today engage in comparative analysis can be
characterized as a form of dialogue. An oft-cited account is that of
former Canadian Supreme Court Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, who
suggests that current patterns of jurisprudential influence are
qualitatively different from those of the past.12 Whereas courts
previously influenced one another through a process of “reception,” in
which colonial powers and global hegemons engaged in “one-way
transmission” of constitutional jurisprudence that courts in weaker
countries would simply receive and imitate, constitutional courts now
engage in an “active and ongoing dialogue”13 wherein they evaluate the
work of other courts in open-minded yet critical fashion and, in so doing,
contribute to an ongoing conversation on matters of substance.14 This
12. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 21.
13. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 66 (referring to a female “Canadian constitutional court
justice”).
14. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that “it was appropriate, until recently, to speak
of the interaction among judges in different places as a process where some courts impacted others,”
and arguing that, by contrast, judges are now “mutually reading and discussing each others’
jurisprudence” to “a greater and greater extent”) (emphasis in original); see, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra
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move from a paradigm of “reception” to one of “dialogue” is attributed
to processes of globalization that have lowered the barriers to global
interaction and thereby enabled constitutional courts to look to a broader
range of jurisdictions with greater ease and sophistication.15
The use of dialogue as a metaphor for the comparative analysis found
in constitutional decisions is problematic on multiple levels. A threshold
problem is that of whether comparative analysis can be characterized as
“dialogue” as a purely conceptual or definitional matter. “Dialogue” is
defined by the Oxford English Dictionary in the following ways: (1) “A
conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk
together”; (2) “Verbal interchange of thought between two or more
persons, conversation”; and (3) “discussion or diplomatic contact
between the representatives of two nations, groups, or the like,” or, more
generally, “valuable or constructive discussion or communication.”16
None of these definitions fits the practice of comparative analysis by
constitutional courts terribly well. Two speakers addressing different
audiences cannot be described as engaged in a dialogue with each other,
even if they happen to conduct their conversations within earshot of each
other. Nor can it be said that a dialogue exists between the two speakers
if they eavesdrop upon each other, or even if each speaker happens to
discuss the content of what is heard with his or her own audience. So,
too, with constitutional courts. The act of judicial review may involve a
substantial amount of dialogue,17 but it is not dialogue with
constitutional courts in other countries. The decisions that a court
renders are necessarily targeted first and foremost at the domestic
audiences who will be legally bound by them.18 As a practical matter,
the reactions of courts in other countries are at most a secondary
consideration for a court grappling with a grave and controversial
question of constitutional law, assuming that they are a consideration at
all.19 Indeed, constitutional judges who choose to write with foreign
note 3, at 66, 70; Waters, supra note 3, at 492–93.
15. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 16–23.
16. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989 & online version Nov. 2010).
17. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 707, 757 (2001) (discussing mechanisms for encouraging “inter-institutional dialogue”
between constitutional courts and legislatures).
18. Exceptions to the practical requirement that domestic courts address their opinions to those
who will be bound by them are noteworthy precisely because they are exceptional. See Young,
supra note 3, at 28–29 & n.8 (suggesting that former Australian High Court Justice Kirby’s “outlier
interpretations” were written less for other Australian justices or even future generations of
Australians, than for a global audience).
19. See, e.g., Interview with Justice G, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan, Dec. 27, 2010 (explaining that, when deciding constitutional
cases, the members of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court “think primarily of the [decision’s] impact on
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audiences in mind do so at their own peril, as Justice Breyer discovered
firsthand when he dared to cite a decision by the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe, partly in the hope of offering succor to the beleaguered judge
who had authored the opinion.20
The outpouring of outrage and ridicule elicited by this passing
citation21—which ultimately led Justice Breyer himself to disavow the
citation as ill-advised22—highlights another reason why dialogue is not
an apt metaphor for what constitutional courts are actually doing when
they engage in comparative analysis. As an initial matter, it is not
difficult to see why the notion of dialogue might be an especially
appealing metaphor for elite lawyers and judges steeped in the tenets of
political liberalism23 and the Legal Process school.24 In the face of the
society, how people will feel, what this will do to them, and what this will do to the development of
the country. We will also think of how this makes us look internationally. A more distant
consideration, but we do think about it.”).
20. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(citing, inter alia, Catholic Comm’n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Attorney-Gen., 1993 (1) Zimb.
L. Rep. 242(S), 252, 282). In a debate with Justice Scalia held in 2005, Justice Breyer alluded to
both his motives for referring to the decision in question and his subsequent misgivings about doing
so:
Look, let me be a little bit more frank, that in some of these countries there are institutions,
courts that are trying to make their way in societies that didn’t used to be democratic, and they
are trying to protect human rights, they are trying to protect democracy. They’re having a
document called a constitution, and they want to be independent judges. And for years people
all over the world have cited the Supreme Court, why don’t we cite them occasionally? They
will then go to some of their legislators and others and say, “See, the Supreme Court of the
United States cites us.” That might give them a leg up, even if we just say it’s an interesting
example. So, you see, it shows we read their opinions. That’s important . . . .
....
. . . I think I may have made what I call a tactical error in citing a case from Zimbabwe—not
the human rights capital of the world. (Laughter.) But it was at an earlier time—Judge [Gubbay
of Zimbabwe] was a very good judge.
Justice Stephen Breyer & Justice Antonin Scalia, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law
for American Constitutional Adjudication, Washington College of Law, American University,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm.
Both the author of the decision cited by Justice Breyer—Chief Justice Gubbay of the Supreme Court
of Zimbabwe—and the Zimbabwean judiciary more generally “had been under direct attack,
including physical threats,” by the Mugabe government, and Chief Justice Gubbay was in fact
subsequently forced to resign. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99; see Int’l Comm’n of Jurists,
Zimbabwe-Attacks on Justice 417–21 (11th ed. 2002), http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/ZimbabweAttacksonJustice2002.pdf.
21. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 23 (calling Justice Breyer’s use of case law from Zimbabwe
“risible”); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 89 (2005)
(deeming it not only “a juridical error,” but also “imprudent[]” to “ask[] the American people . . . to
accept that decisions by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, one of the world’s most disordered
nations, should influence decisions by our Supreme Court”).
22. See supra note 20.
23. See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 14–16
(1995) (noting the emphasis that procedurally oriented liberal democracies place upon the role of
rational discourse in ensuring both liberty and peaceful coexistence).
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deep diversity and intractable divisions that characterize political life at
both the national and global levels, nothing would seem to hold greater
hope for the peaceful, welfare-enhancing resolution of conflict in a
manner that respects human dignity and equality than dialogue. No
harm, and only good, can come of simply talking to one another: is it not
self-evidently so? The metaphor of dialogue is further attractive because
it both implies and promises that all participants are both entitled and
empowered to speak.25 If comparative constitutional analysis is a form of
dialogue on a global scale, then nothing ought to prevent the courts of
Switzerland and Swaziland from participating in that dialogue on equal
terms. Dialogue is supposed to be inclusive, and it is supposed to
involve mutual engagement. Therein lies much of its appeal.
And therein lies the problem as well. It is doubtful that the
requirements of genuine dialogue can be reconciled with the politics of
constitutional adjudication. In order for courts from more influential or
powerful countries to treat courts in other countries with the respect and
recognition due to fellow interlocutors in a true dialogue, they must both
acknowledge and engage reciprocally with their interlocutors. Even if
domestic stakeholders can accept a measure of foreign law usage,
however, the type of foreign law usage that they are prepared to stomach
is unlikely to be a citation practice that (1) respects all countries and
courts as equals, and (2) is intended to allay foreign sensibilities or
nurture a “common global judicial enterprise.”26 The fact that
constitutional courts are compelled as a practical, if not also normative,
matter, to satisfy the expectations and demands of domestic audiences
frustrates the development of a transparent and egalitarian global judicial
discourse.
The use of the metaphor of dialogue to describe judicial
comparativism is not only contrary to ordinary definition and political
logic, but also lacking in empirical support. The handful of high-profile
cases that tend to be recycled as evidence of dialogue do not appear to be

24. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, xciv, cxiii–cxxxvi (1994) (noting the
Legal Process school’s emphasis upon deliberative procedures as a vehicle for reaching rational
policy decisions in the face of “dispersed power and diverse views about substantive views,” and
discussing the profound impact of this school of thought upon three generations of lawyers and legal
scholars).
25. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 71 (observing that the notion of dialogue implies “reciprocal
intellectual give and take,” and suggesting that “engagement” is a more apt metaphor than
“dialogue” because courts “may engage the work of other courts . . . without any necessary
expectation of response”).
26. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99.
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representative of overall practice.27 Consider the two courts that have
been repeatedly identified as the most active and influential participants
in global judicial dialogue of the comparative-analysis variety—namely,
the Supreme Court of Canada and the South African Constitutional
Court.28 It is reasonable to think that the most important participants in a
so-called dialogue would refer to one another’s decisions. Indeed, two of
the four cases that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé cites as evidence of the shift
from “one-way transmission” to “dialogue” implicate both of these
courts.29 Yet the exchange of ideas between these two courts is so
lopsided that it is more accurately described as a monologue than a
dialogue. As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé herself acknowledges, although
the Canadian Supreme Court “is willing to look elsewhere, and does so
frequently, it is cited by courts like those in Zimbabwe, South Africa,
and Israel far more often than it refers to their cases.”30 This is, if
anything, an understatement. In fact, the South African Constitutional
Court cites decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court almost three
hundred times more often than vice versa. Between 1995 and 2009, the
justices of the South African Constitutional Court cited Canadian
Supreme Court decisions on a collective total of 850 occasions.31 By
27. The standard examples include a trio of cases involving the death penalty: the South African
Constitutional Court’s decision in State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (2) SA 391 (CC); the Canadian
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.); and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note
8, at 56–57 (discussing Burns); id. at 78–79 (discussing Makwanyane); SLAUGHTER, supra note 3,
at 80, 284 n.68 (discussing Makwanyane); Kirby, supra note 3, at 178 n.28, 186 n.81 (citing
Makwanyane and Atkins); Waters, supra note 3, at 507 n.100, 557 n.315, 514–15 (discussing
Makwanyane); id. at 521–23 (discussing Burns).
28. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 74 (singling out the South African Constitutional
Court and the “Canadian Constitutional Court” [sic] as “highly influential, apparently more so than
the U.S. Supreme Court and other older and more established constitutional courts”); Heinz Klug,
Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World Constitutionalism,”
2000 WISC. L. REV. 597, 607 (noting that the “highest courts of constitutional review in Canada,
India, South Africa, [and] Zimbabwe . . . all engage in extensive discussion of comparative
constitutional jurisprudence”); Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 3, at 45 (using the Supreme Court
of Canada and Constitutional Court of South Africa to define the category of courts that make open
and “wide-ranging use of foreign law”); Waters, supra note 3, at 558 n.316 (identifying the
Canadian Supreme Court as “one of the most influential domestic courts worldwide on human
rights issues”); Liptak, supra note 1, at A1 (“Many legal scholars single[] out the Canadian Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Court of South Africa as increasingly influential.”).
29. See L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 21–22 (citing Makwanyane, 1995 (2) SA 391 (CC) (S.
Afr.), and Hugo v. South Africa (President) 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC)). The other two examples are a
Namibian case, Mwellie v. Ministry of Works [1995] 4 L.R.C. 184 (Namib.), and a case from New
Zealand, Police v. Smith & Herewini [1994] 2 NZLR 306 (CA).
30. L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 27.
31. See Christa Rautenbach, Presentation at the VIIIth World Congress of the International
Association of Constitutional Law: Use of Foreign Precedents by South African Constitutional
Judges: Making Sense of Statistics (Dec. 8, 2010).
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comparison, over the same period of time the members of the Supreme
Court of Canada cited decisions of their South African counterpart only
three times.32 It is possible, of course, that the Canadian Supreme Court
looks habitually to the South African Constitutional Court for guidance
and inspiration and merely declines to cite foreign sources explicitly.33
But nothing in Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s firsthand account of her own
court suggests that this might be the case.34 On the contrary, one of her
former colleagues, Justice Michel Bastarache, reports that “attribution is
systematic and considered mandatory” whenever the Canadian Supreme
Court draws upon foreign jurisprudence.35
The fact that the conversation between these two standard-bearers of
32. A search of the CANSCC-CS database on Westlaw conducted on February 4, 2011, for any
appearance of the words “South Africa” between 1995 and 2009 yields a total of fifteen results; of
these, only three involve actual citations to a decision of the South African Constitutional Court. See
Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607; R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309; United States v. Burns,
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; see also Bijon Roy, An Empirical Survey of Foreign Jurisprudence and
International Instruments in Charter Litigation, 62 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 99, 125 (2004)
(reporting that, from 1998 through 2003, the constitutional decisions of the Canadian Supreme
Court referred to South African jurisprudence on just three occasions).
33. As many scholars have noted—and as we document in this Article, see infra Parts III.F–
III.G—courts frequently engage in comparative analysis without acknowledging explicitly that they
have done so. See, e.g., Markesinis & Fedtke, supra note 3, at 28–29 (noting that, although French
judicial opinions are prevented for stylistic and historical reasons from citing foreign law or
academic authorities, the avocats genereaux who advise the Cour de Cassation “are nowadays
expected to consult foreign law when preparing their recommendations”) (emphasis in original);
Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations
on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 511 (2000) (distinguishing between
“explicit” and “non-explicit” references to foreign law); Edward McWhinney, Judicial Review in a
Federal and Plural Society: The Supreme Court of Canada, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS:
CHALLENGING FRONTIERS IN CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 63, 69–70 (John R.
Schmidhauser ed., 1987) (describing American-trained Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ivan
Rand’s deliberate failure to acknowledge the American origins of certain approaches that he
adopted, in light of resistance from his colleagues to the use of American law); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 118 (1994)
(“Considerable anecdotal evidence, gleaned from confidential interviews with law clerks of foreign
courts and from careful reading between the lines, demonstrates that courts draw on the opinions of
foreign courts without attribution.”).
34. See L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 27.
35. Michel Bastarache, How Internationalization of the Law Has Materialized in Canada, 59 U.
NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 190, 200 (2009); see also id. at 196, 204 (stating that “the influence of
judicial borrowing in Canada is overstated by some,” and concluding that “internationalization has
had a minimal impact on our Court to date”). Speaking on condition of anonymity, a former
Canadian Supreme Court clerk confirmed that, in his own experience, foreign jurisprudence would
be cited if it had been considered. See E-mail From Anonymous Former Law Clerk, Supreme Court
of Can., to David S. Law (Sept. 16, 2011, 17:50 CDT) (on file with authors). But see Lorraine E.
Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 25 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002) (stating
that Canadian justices frequently considered foreign law in the years immediately following the
1982 adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms but “often did not note their
sources”).
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constitutional comparativism amounts to a monologue raises a troubling
question for those who liken such comparativism to “dialogue.” If the
“highly influential” South African Constitutional Court36 maintains such
a lopsided and disappointing balance of intellectual trade with a court
that is renowned for its role in promoting global judicial dialogue, what
hope do less influential or well-known courts have of being participants
in a genuine “dialogue,” instead of engaging merely in “reception”?
Moreover, it is not only courts from countries that are known for human
rights abuses or otherwise lack international credibility, such as
Zimbabwe, that risk exclusion from this so-called dialogue. Rather,
reputable courts from vibrant democracies, such as South Africa and
Taiwan, are also effectively excluded.37
Those who see the emergence of a “global judicial dialogue” are
correct to observe that many constitutional courts pay careful attention to
the decisions of their counterparts in other countries. That does not
mean, however, that these courts can accurately be described as
participants in a global judicial dialogue. Even if the intellectual traffic
in ideas is growing, it continues to be largely one-way. The concept of
dialogue implies open communication among interlocutors committed to
listening as well as to speaking, and it holds out the promise of mutual
learning and understanding. That is precisely why it is so appealing. But
political realities, normative considerations, and enduring differences in
prestige and credibility among courts all distort and restrict the flow of
ideas to the point that the characteristics of genuine dialogue are lacking.
When courts do analyze foreign jurisprudence, it often occurs
surreptitiously, in the form of opinions that refrain from citing foreign
law explicitly,38 or in ways that marginalize all but a small handful of
elite courts.39 At least for now, efforts to characterize judicial
comparativism as a form of dialogue are better understood as the
expression of a hope for the future than as a descriptively accurate
assessment of actual practice.

36. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 74.
37. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (describing the failure of other courts to cite the
work of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, even when it happens to be directly relevant).
38. See supra note 33 (citing various examples of courts that routinely consider foreign law
without also citing it).
39. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (describing the hostile and at times incredulous
reaction to Justice Breyer’s citation of precedent from Zimbabwe); infra notes 62–63 and
accompanying text (describing the extent to which other constitutional courts, even in the same
region, have ignored the jurisprudence of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court).
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II.

THE LIMITED IMPACT OF JUDGE-TO-JUDGE DIALOGUE

A.

Behind Closed Doors: The Mystery Surrounding Judge-to-Judge
Dialogue

Unlike the citation behavior of constitutional courts, judge-to-judge
dialogue—or “J2J,” in the words of one justice40—is dialogue in the
literal and truest sense of the word. Actual interaction between judges,
especially of the face-to-face variety that receives such emphasis in the
literature, feels at once both glamorous and vaguely conspiratorial.
Existing accounts of this species of judicial dialogue, cobbled together
from snippets and reports of closed meetings in Bangalore,41
Johannesburg,42 and New Haven43 tantalize the reader with glimpses of
something elusive and, for that very reason, seemingly important. They
conjure up an image of judges trotting the globe to chart the course of
constitutional law behind closed doors before returning home to impose
this master scheme on their unwitting compatriots, with no one the wiser
except the judges themselves and perhaps a handful of privileged legal
academics located predominantly at elite law schools in the northeastern
United States that have the prestige and financial wherewithal to
dispatch their faculty to wherever these judicial gatherings may occur or,
better yet, to host such gatherings themselves.44 The resultant sense,
perhaps, is that of being privy to the inner life of opaque “judicial
networks” that engage in de facto global governance, or the exercise of
power without authority, as part of a “new world order.”45
The opposite and more skeptical view would be that the entire notion
of J2J dialogue boils down to the unexceptional and inconsequential
claim that judges enjoy a growing range of opportunities to socialize
over cocktails and have also learned to e-mail one another. On this view,
one might be forgiven for thinking that “the “global community of
courts”46 constituted by transnational judicial dialogue is a toothless
40. Interview with Justice J, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 30, 2010).
41. Kirby, supra note 3, at 179.
42. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 66.
43. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 8, at 102, 341 n.199; SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 98; Kirby,
supra note 3, at 180; Waters, supra note 3, at 496.
44. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 98 (citing conferences held at NYU Law School and
Yale Law School); Kirby, supra note 3, at 179 (discussing, inter alia, the Bangalore conference);
McCrudden, supra note 33, at 511; Waters, supra note 3, at 495–96.
45. E.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 15–17, 137–38; RABKIN, supra note 1, at 41; SLAUGHTER, supra
note 3, at 261–71.
46. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 191, 192 (2003)
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development that bears more resemblance to “a literary salon writ
large”47 than an innovation in global governance capable of generating
“an increasingly global constitutional jurisprudence.”48
The empirical claims that are more typically made about the practical
impact of J2J interaction are somewhat vague. A common theme,
however, is that dialogue of the J2J variety encourages judges to engage
in comparative analysis.49 Anne-Marie Slaughter, an early and
prominent champion of global judicial dialogue, identifies a number of
cognitive and social effects that “all these visits and exchanges and
seminars” have on judges.50 These opportunities for interaction
“educate” and “cross-fertilize,” “broaden the perspectives of the
participating judges,” “socialize” them as “participants in a common
global judicial enterprise,”51 and ultimately foster “an increasingly
global constitutional jurisprudence” across a broad range of human
rights issues.52 Melissa Waters is more circumspect but ultimately makes
similar claims: “‘Face-to-face’ contact among the world’s judges is
increasingly frequent,” “has undoubtedly been a major factor in certain
U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ increased interest” in other forms of
dialogue such as comparative analysis, and “has undoubtedly played a
significant role in creating an environment” in which these other forms
of “dialogue can flourish.”53
The evidentiary support for these claims is anecdotal at best. There is
little reason to doubt that J2J dialogue does occur and has even increased
in frequency. But it is reasonable to wonder whether inclusion in the
latest judicial gathering at Yale Law School has any tangible effect on
the development of a nation’s constitutional jurisprudence.54 Does J2J
dialogue affect the way in which judges decide actual cases, and if so,
(describing a “community of courts” constituted by the “self-awareness” of judges who are “coming
together in all sorts of ways,” “from seminars to training sessions and judicial organizations”).
47. Law, supra note 1, at 702.
48. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 66.
49. See, e.g., id. at 66, 99; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism, in
INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 106, 135 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006)
(deeming “a marked increase in citations of foreign judgments” by Australian courts since 1980 “a
consequence of ‘globalisation,’” along with “easier access to foreign materials through the internet,
and increased interaction among judges at international conferences”); Kirby, supra note 3, at 173–
80 (linking “the advent of the internet,” “enhanced international travel,” and the proliferation of
international judicial groups and gatherings to the increased use of international human rights law
by national judges); Waters, supra note 3, at 495–96.
50. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 99.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 66.
53. Waters, supra note 3, at 495–96.
54. See sources cited supra note 43; infra text accompanying note 117.
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how? What are the content and consequences of this dialogue? To what
extent is it substantive, and to what extent is it social or personal in
nature? To the extent that it is substantive, does it furnish judges with
knowledge that they would not otherwise possess or acquire? Whatever
its content, does direct interaction between judges pique their curiosity
about foreign law, or encourage them to cite other courts more often, as
some scholars have suggested? And even assuming that dialogue of this
kind does in fact increase judicial interest in foreign law, what is its
importance relative to domestic institutional variables, such as the
prevalence of foreign legal training or the availability of support
personnel who have received such training?
These questions are difficult to answer empirically for a number of
reasons. A methodological challenge is that such questions concern, for
the most part, the content of private communication between
government officials and the impact of such communication on decisionmaking that also occurs behind closed doors. The only publicly available
record of this behavior, for the most part, consists of the opinions that
judges produce, which are painstakingly edited for public consumption
and are neither designed nor intended to reveal the psychological or
interpersonal dynamics behind their production. Quantitative analysis of
these opinions cannot necessarily capture the frequency with which
courts use foreign law, much less the reasons for which it is used. It is
common practice for certain courts to consider foreign law without
explicitly citing it in their opinions.55 Thus, perhaps the only way to
investigate the content and consequences of transnational J2J dialogue is
to interview actual judges about their own experiences. Constitutional
court justices do not ordinarily volunteer, however, to talk candidly and
in detail about the content of their private discussions with foreign
judges, the nature and extent of their participation in the world’s judicial
networks, and the reasons and motivations underlying their own usage of
foreign law.
Another methodological challenge is the need for cross-country
comparison and identification of a suitable case study. In order to isolate
the impact of J2J dialogue on judicial behavior, it would help greatly to
compare the behavior of a constitutional court that engages in a
considerable amount of J2J dialogue with that of a court that engages in
very little. The literature is replete with examples of constitutional courts

55. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency with which courts and
judges decline to acknowledge foreign sources); infra note 63 (describing the reluctance of the
South Korean Constitutional Court, Japanese Supreme Court, and Taiwanese Constitutional Court
to explicitly cite foreign law, even when it has been taken into consideration).
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that participate in this dialogue.56 But where might one find a court that
does not? Ideally, one would study a constitutional court that is generally
comparable in most respects to courts that do participate in transnational
J2J dialogue—in other words, a court that belongs to a bona fide
constitutional democracy and enjoys the freedom to embrace or reject
techniques such as comparative analysis—yet has also for some reason
been excluded from this dialogue. If globalization has indeed lowered
the barriers to global interaction and thus rendered J2J dialogue
increasingly ubiquitous, however, then such an isolated court ought not
to exist.
Enter Taiwan.
B.

A Natural Experiment in Dialogue Deprivation

Although the two countries may be oceans apart, the country that still
formally styles itself the Republic of China shares a number of key
historical and political characteristics with South Africa, the darling of
constitutional comparativists. Both are recent democratic success stories.
Like South Africa, Taiwan endured years of both internal and external
legitimacy crises, only to rapidly establish itself over the last two
decades as one of the most vibrant and robust constitutional democracies
in its region of the world.57 And like South Africa, Taiwan possesses an
independent and active constitutional court with an outstanding
intellectual pedigree, a large policy footprint, and a penchant for
comparative analysis.58
But it is there, unfortunately, that the similarities end. Unlike postapartheid South Africa, Taiwan remains diplomatically and politically
isolated from the rest of the world, to an extent that even comparative
constitutional scholars may not necessarily grasp. As a result, unlike the
South African Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China (hereinafter the “Taiwanese Constitutional Court,” or
“TCC”) faces severe constraints upon its ability to participate in the
“judicial networks”59 and opportunities for judge-to-judge interaction
that are so often emphasized in the literature on global judicial dialogue.
And whereas the South African Constitutional Court is widely viewed as
56. See supra notes 2–3.
57. See infra Part II.C.
58. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 144–51 (2003) (describing the TCC’s role in dismantling the remnants of
authoritarianism and reshaping the law in various areas along democratic lines); infra text
accompanying notes 97–102 (discussing the educational background of the court’s members); infra
Part III.G (discussing the court’s heavy usage of foreign law).
59. SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 65–103.
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“highly” or even “disproportionately influential,”60 few scholars would
dream of saying the same about the TCC—assuming, indeed, that they
have ever given the TCC any thought at all.61 Over the course of
numerous interviews with twelve current and former members of the
TCC, not a single one believed that any of the TCC’s decisions had ever
been cited by any other constitutional court. Neither the U.S. Supreme
Court nor the Canadian Supreme Court has ever cited the TCC.62 Nor,
indeed, have the TCC’s closest neighbors, the Supreme Court of Japan
and the Constitutional Court of South Korea, ever done so.63 Yet
60. Id. at 74.
61. For a prominent and important exception, see GINSBURG, cited above in note 58, at 106–57.
For a discussion of just how widely ignored the TCC’s jurisprudence happens to be, see text
accompanying notes 108–69 below.
62. A search of all U.S. Supreme Court and Canadian Supreme Court decisions available on
Westlaw for the terms “Interpretation No” and “Taiwan” uncovered not a single case in which either
court cited a TCC decision. The closest that either court came to doing so was in National City Bank
of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), which concerned the ability of the R.O.C.
government to bring suit in federal court. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court cited two early
decisions of Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan in 1929 and 1930, at which time Taiwan was still under
Japanese rule and the Constitutional Court did not yet exist. See id. at 363 n.8, 364 n.10.
63. Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan and the Korean Constitutional Court can be
searched at the official English websites of the two courts. See Judgments of the Supreme Court,
SUPREME CT. OF JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/index.html (last visited Aug.
31, 2011); CONST. CT. OF KOREA, http://english.ccourt.go.kr (last visited Aug. 31, 2011). The lack
of citations by these two courts can be explained by the fact that, like Taiwan’s Constitutional
Court, both the Japanese Supreme Court and the Korean Constitutional Court tend not to cite
foreign law explicitly, even if they have investigated it in the course of reaching their decisions. See
Akiko Ejima, Enigmatic Attitude of the Supreme Court of Japan towards Foreign Precedents:
Refusal at the Front Door and Admission at the Back Door, 16 MEIJI L.J. 19, 21, 28–34 (2009)
(reporting no direct citation of foreign cases in the majority opinions between January 1, 1990, and
July 31, 2008, and only seven cases in which dissenting opinions directly cited foreign cases and
four cases whose concurring opinions referred to foreign cases).
Empirical studies of foreign law usage by South Korea’s Constitutional Court are lacking, but the
Court’s extensive use of foreign law is evident from its case law as well as from interviews
conducted with two former law clerks or “constitutional research officers.” One interviewee, who
had two years of experience as a “constitutional research officer,” indicated that it is standard
practice for that court’s researchers to investigate all relevant foreign law in every case and to report
their findings to the justices; another with over a decade of experience estimated that research on
foreign law occurs at least sixty percent of the time. See Interview with Former Constitutional
Research Officer, Constitutional Court of Korea, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 25, 2011). Indeed, the
Constitutional Court of Korea is currently in the midst of creating a research institute that will be
staffed by full-time researchers who speak English, German, Japanese, or Spanish. See E-mail from
Chulwoo Lee, Professor of Law, Yonsei University Graduate School of Law, to David S. Law (Feb.
25, 2011, 20:13 PST) (on file with authors); The Constitutional Court Research Institute—
Professor/Researcher Recruitment Announcement (Feb. 25, 2011) (on file with the authors)
(identifying four “zones of language” from which researchers will be hired). The Korean
Constitutional Court has cited Taiwanese law in three recent cases, but in none of these cases did it
refer to the jurisprudence of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court. See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.],
97Hun-Ka12, Aug. 31, 2000 (2000 DKCC, 52, 60) (S. Kor.), English translation available at
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/library/decision_2000.pdf (referring to Taiwan along with
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notwithstanding its marginalization, the extent to which the TCC
engages in comparative analysis is second to none—far more so, indeed,
than a court such as the U.S. Supreme Court that enjoys virtually
unlimited opportunities for judicial interaction.
To gather data on the TCC’s participation in J2J dialogue and usage
of foreign law, we conducted confidential, face-to-face interviews with
twelve current and former members of the Court and nine current law
clerks.64 We also analyzed all of the TCC’s constitutional decisions—
including majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions—for either
explicit or implicit references to foreign law.65 In order to provide the
necessary factual context for our findings, however, we must first delve
into the history of Taiwan and the organization of the TCC. Part III.C
summarizes Taiwan’s political history and relationship with China,
while Part III.D offers a brief overview of the history, structure, and
jurisdiction of the TCC.
C.

Taiwan: The Most Marginalized Democracy in the World

Taiwan, an island nation of twenty-three million people, is perhaps
the most isolated democracy in the world today.66 Indeed, it is besieged.
other Asian countries such as Indonesia and Thailand as examples of nationality systems that
remain keyed to the father’s lineage); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2002Hun-Ka14, June 26,
2003, (2003 DKCC, 45, 67) (S. Kor.), English translation available at
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/library/decision_2003.pdf (noting that the domestic statute
being challenged referenced a similar law in Taiwan); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2002HunKa1, Aug. 26, 2004, (2004 DKCC, 11, 43) (S. Kor.), English translation available at
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/library/decision_2002.pdf (featuring a dissenting opinion that
cited Taiwan, along with Germany, Denmark, France, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Brazil, as examples
of countries that allow conscientious objectors to serve alternative, non-combat forms of mandatory
military service). Indeed, in the last of these cases, the Korean Constitutional Court failed to
acknowledge a Taiwanese decision that was highly relevant to the law being discussed. In response
to the majority’s conclusion that conscientious objectors were not constitutionally entitled to serve
an alternative form of mandatory military service, the dissenting opinion made a point of noting that
Taiwan makes alternative forms of military service available to military objectors. The majority
opinion failed to note, however, that five years earlier, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court upheld
an earlier version of Taiwan’s mandatory military service law that made no such allowance for
conscientious objectors. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 490, 12 SHIZI 20 (Const. Ct. Oct. 1, 1999)
(Taiwan).
64. The interviews were conducted by Professor Law, on some occasions in conjunction with
Professor Chang and once with the participation of Professor Carol Lin of National Chiao Tong
University, in a combination of Mandarin and English depending upon the preferences of the
interviewee. Some justices were interviewed more than once. Professor Chang herself served as a
law clerk to former Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng of the TCC but is not counted among the
interviewees.
65. The quantitative data collection and analysis were performed by Professor Chang in
conjunction with Professor Jiunn-Rong Yeh. See infra note 170.
66. As of March 2011, the R.O.C. has official diplomatic ties with only twenty-three nations. See
Diplomatic Allies, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
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Despite the fact that it has never actually governed or controlled the
island for even a single day, the People’s Republic of China (“P.R.C.” or
simply “China”) views the fully democratic, functionally independent
Republic of China (“R.O.C.,” now widely known as “Taiwan”) as a
renegade province and claims sovereignty over the island.67 The
perplexing state of today’s relationship between China and Taiwan is a
direct result of the even more perplexing relationship between the two
entities during the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries.68
In 1895, Taiwan and a number of smaller, adjacent islands were
ceded by the Qing Dynasty to Japan as part of the price for losing the
Sino-Japanese War.69 Upon Japan’s surrender to the Allies at the end of
World War II in 1945, the Nationalist (Kuomintang or “KMT”)
government of the Republic of China, which had succeeded the Qing
Dynasty, took control of the islands and declared them a province of the
R.O.C.70 Four years later, however, the KMT government lost the civil
war to the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland and retreated to
Taiwan.71 The Communists established the P.R.C. in 1949 and claimed it
was the only legitimate government of China, while the KMT
government in Taiwan made the same competing claim.72 In the ensuing
decades of intense diplomatic rivalry, the P.R.C. dealt Taiwan a massive
blow in 1971 when the United Nations General Assembly passed a
resolution expelling “the representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek” from the
seats that the R.O.C. was deemed to have unlawfully occupied at the
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=32618&CtNode=1865&mp=6 (last visited Aug. 3,
2011). For recent contributions to the debate over the R.O.C.’s status as a state from the perspective
of international law, see, for example, JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 198–221 (2007); Lung-chu Chen, Taiwan’s Current International Legal
Status, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 675, 677–80 (1998); Frank Chiang, State, Sovereignty and Taiwan, 23
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 959, 982–86 (2000); and Brad R. Roth, The Entity That Dare Not Speak Its
Name: Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-Bearer in the International Legal Order, 4 E. ASIA L. REV.
91, 110–14 (2009).
67. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM
328–31 (2d ed. 2004); Robert A. Madsen, The Struggle for Sovereignty Between China and Taiwan,
in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 141, 158–59
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001).
68. See generally TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., expanded ed., 2007);
SIMON LONG, TAIWAN: CHINA’S LAST FRONTIER (1991).
69. The cession was pursuant to the TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, May 8,
1895, 181 C.T.S. 217. See Chiang, supra note 66, at 995.
70. See Madsen, supra note 67, at 147–48.
71. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 67, at 52–53; Madsen, supra note 67, at 148.
72. For further analysis of the competing claims made by both the P.R.C. and R.O.C., see
Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and
Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453, 458–73 (2000), and Chiang, cited above in note 66, at 998–99,
1003–04.

WLR_October_Law_FINAL.doc

542

10/21/2011 1:16 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:523

United Nations,73 which included a permanent seat on the Security
Council. Another blow came in 1979, when the United States withdrew
its formal recognition of the R.O.C. and established formal diplomatic
ties with China in its place,74 although the United States remains
responsible by statute for Taiwan’s defense.75 Since that time, the P.R.C.
has leveraged its massive and escalating economic and political clout to
quash the R.O.C.’s dwindling diplomatic ties with other states76 and
prevent it from participating in international treaty regimes or
organizations, especially (but not limited to) those related in any way to
the United Nations.77 At present, the R.O.C. is able only on rare
73. G.A. Res. 2758, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); see Madsen,
supra note 67, at 156 (describing the R.O.C.’s attempt to “salvage a bit of pride” by walking out of
the General Assembly before it could be expelled). Chiang Kai-Shek was at that time President of
the R.O.C. For further background, see generally HARVEY J. FELDMAN, TAIWAN AND THE UNITED
NATIONS: CONFLICT BETWEEN DOMESTIC POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES 15 (1995).
74. For further elaboration, see, for example, JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE, CROSSING THE DIVIDE: AN
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF NORMALIZATION OF U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS 179–85 (1997).
75. Congress responded in 1979 to the Carter Administration’s termination of diplomatic ties
with Taiwan by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 3301–16 (1979)), and making the act effective retroactively to January 1 of that year. See
CONG. REC. H1668-70 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1979). The goal of the Act was to preserve stability in the
region and maintain growing trade relations with Taiwan without offending the P.R.C. government.
The Act refers to the R.O.C. government and its successors on this island as “the governing
authorities on Taiwan” rather than the “Republic of China,” but also provides that references in U.S.
law to foreign countries, nations, states, or governments will be deemed to include Taiwan. 22
U.S.C. § 3303. With respect to Taiwan’s military security, the Act obligates the United States “to
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and “to maintain the capacity of the United
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” Id. § 3301.
76. See Foreign Policy Report, 7th Congress of the Legislative Yuan, 1st Session (Mar. 5, 2008),
in 26 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 205, 214 (2008) (reporting that China is pursuing all
possible strategies to take away Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies and cut off Taiwanese
participation in the international arena).
77. At present, Taiwan cannot join treaties, conventions, organizations, or even economic
cooperation organizations, such as the World Bank, that happen to be affiliated in any way with the
United Nations. Thus, for example, Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to ratify the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—which include unilateral legislative incorporation of the
covenant into domestic law—have, at best, been ignored by the U.N. Secretary-General and, at
worst, explicitly rebuffed. In 2007, Taiwan signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and issued the first state report two years later. In 2009,
the legislature ratified the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and also enacted an Implementation Act that incorporated the rights found in the
two covenants into domestic law. However, Taiwan’s efforts to formally ratify the ICCPR, IESCR,
and CEDAW were all rebuffed by the U.N. Secretary-General on the basis of the 1971 General
Assembly resolution that expelled Taiwan. See Wen-Chen Chang, An Isolated Nation with GlobalMinded Citizens: Bottom-up Transnational Constitutionalism in Taiwan, 4 NTU L. REV. 203, 210,
226 (2009).
Some of the myriad and often petty ways in which the P.R.C. and its proxies have hounded
Taiwanese judges and professors at international events and venues are documented below. See
infra Part III.E (describing, inter alia, the P.R.C.-instigated expulsion of Taiwan’s national
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occasions to participate in international activities or organizations, and
even then only in a limited capacity as a wholly economic entity78 or
under the strategically ambiguous pseudonym of “Chinese Taipei,”
which the P.R.C. has sometimes deemed acceptable in the context of
cultural events such as athletic competitions and beauty pageants.79
This oppressive and growing isolation has not prevented Taiwan,
however, from making extremely robust economic and political progress
since the 1980s. Political liberalization and democratization have
occurred hand-in-hand with double-digit economic growth.80 The
organization of Taiwan’s first opposition party, the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) was tolerated in 1986, and martial law was
formally lifted in 1987.81 As a consequence of both Taiwan’s unique
history and the KMT regime’s need for formal institutions that would
legitimize its continuing rule, the majority of the R.O.C.’s nominally
elected legislators had occupied their seats continuously since 1948 on
the basis that the areas they represented were under Communist control
and could no longer hold elections.82 In 1990, however, the
Constitutional Court rendered a sweeping decision ordering these
superannuated incumbents to leave office and mandating new
elections.83 The R.O.C. Constitution has since been revised seven times,
and in 2000, Taiwan’s first democratic transfer of government power
took place when the DPP candidate won the presidency.84 In 2008, the
second peaceful transfer of government power occurred as the KMT
fought its way back to control of both the executive and legislative

association of constitutional law scholars from the International Association of Constitutional Law,
a private scholarly organization).
78. For example, Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a separate customs
territory rather than as a country and has been able to join certain fishery conventions as a separate
fishing entity. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 66, at 114.
79. See Catherine Kai-Ping Lin, Nationalism in International Politics: The Republic of China’s
Sports Foreign Policy-Making and Diplomacy from 1972 to 1981, at 234–62 (Feb. 28, 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with the author) (offering a
detailed historical account of how Taiwan has been forced to participate in atheletic competitions
under
the
name
of
“Chinese
Taipei”);
Chinese
Taipei,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Taipei (last updated July 30, 2011) (discussing Taiwan’s use
of the “Chinese Taipei” pseudonym in athletic competitions and beauty pageants).
80. See HUNG-MAO TIEN, THE GREAT TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 17–18 (1989).
81. See GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 118.
82. See id. at 129.
83. J.Y. Interpretation No. 261, 4 SHIZI 110 (Const. Ct. June 21, 1990) (Taiwan).
84. See Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Presidential Politics and Judicial Facilitation of Political Dialogue
between Political Actors in New Asian Democracies: Comparing the South Korean and Taiwanese
Experiences, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 911, 911–12 (2010).
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branches.85 Democracy in Taiwan is now characterized by, inter alia,
fiercely contested elections at both the local and national levels, and an
abundance of independent media outlets that habitually attack the
government with a degree of dogged partisanship that even American
observers might find startling.86
D.

The History and Structure of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court

Established in 1948, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, formerly known as the Council of Grand Justices, is now one of
the oldest constitutional courts in Asia.87 In the European or Kelsenian
mold,88 the TCC is a specialized court with jurisdiction over
constitutional questions raised by individual petitions or referred by the
lower courts, jurisdictional conflicts between government agencies, and
serious political matters such as presidential impeachment and
dissolution of unconstitutional political parties.89 Apart from its
85. Id.
86. Yeh, supra note 84, at 911–12; see also Chang Wen-Chen, Ling Lei te Hsien Kai Kung
Cheng: Po Chien Tai Wan te Fa Chih Yu Cheng Chih Hsin Jen [Alternative Agenda in
Constitutional Reengineering: Ensuring the Rule of Law and Political Trust in Taiwan], in HSIN
HSING MIN CHU TE HSIEN CHENG KAI TSAO [CONSTITUTIONAL REENGINEERING IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES: TAIWAN AND THE WORLD] 307, 307–09 (Yeh Jiunn-Rong & Chang Wen-Chen
eds., 2008).
87. Under the 1958 Act Regarding the Council of Grand Justices, the Court was known as the
Council of Grand Justices and was later rechristened the Constitutional Court by the 1993
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act. See Wen-Chen Chang, The Role of Judicial Review in
Consolidating Democracy: The Case of Taiwan, 2 ASIA L. REV., Dec. 2005, at 73, 74 n.1, 76–78
(explaining the name change). The TCC was established in accordance with the Republic of China
Constitution, which was promulgated and became effective in Nanjing, China in 1947. Upon the
defeat of the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government by the Communists in the Chinese civil war, the
government, including the TCC, relocated to Taiwan in 1949. See GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 107,
111; TA FA KUAN SHI XIAN SHI LIAO [HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATIONS] 55–56
(Secretariat Judicial Yuan ed., 1998). For a brief introduction to the Court and the content of the
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act, see Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act,
JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73 (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
88. The goal of the drafters of the R.O.C. Constitution was apparently to create a court of general
jurisdiction more akin to the U.S. Supreme Court that would have final authority over all cases, not
simply constitutional questions. Due in large part to a drafting error consisting of the last-minute
resequencing of relevant provisions of the constitution, however, the TCC found itself limited to
abstract constitutional review and a handful of specialty jurisdictions enumerated in the constitution.
See Wen-Chen Chang, Transition to Democracy, Constitutionalism and Judicial Activism: Taiwan
in Comparative Constitutional Perspective 138–45 (2001) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale
Law School). Since then, it has ruled that it may hear constitutional questions referred by the lower
courts, thus conferring upon itself a form of concrete review power. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 590,
18 SHIZI 90 (Const. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005); J.Y. Interpretation No. 572, 17 SHIZI 113 (Const. Ct. Feb. 6,
2004); J.Y. Interpretation No. 371, 7 SHIZI 26 (Const. Ct. Jan. 20, 1995).
89. Unlike other constitutional courts that can grant relief to litigants, Taiwan’s Constitutional
Court only rules on the constitutionality of laws and regulations in response to petitions for

WLR_October_Law_FINAL.doc

2011]

10/21/2011 1:16 PM

GLOBAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE

545

jurisdiction over constitutional questions and various political matters,
the Constitutional Court is also responsible for issuing uniform
interpretations of statutes and regulations in situations where the regular
and administrative courts arrive at conflicting interpretations.90 This
jurisdiction over uniform interpretations now constitutes only two
percent of the Court’s caseload, down from approximately twenty
percent in the 1960s and 1970s and fifty percent in the 1950s.91
The Constitutional Court is composed of fifteen justices who are
appointed by the President upon confirmation by the Legislative Yuan
for a nonrenewable term of eight years, with the exception of the two
justices who serve concurrently as president and vice president of the
Judicial Yuan and are not guaranteed a full eight years in office.92 By
statute, the Court is to be composed of a mixture of legal scholars, career
judges, legislators, and persons with a combination of scholarly and
political experience. The Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan sets forth five
categories of people who are eligible for appointment, and no single
category is supposed to comprise more than one-third of the Court.93 In
constitutional interpretations. If a law or regulation is found unconstitutional by the TCC, the
litigant who sucessfully challenged the law must then seek a retrial or special trial in a regular court
in order to obtain the benefit of the TCC’s ruling. See Petition for Interpretation, JUSTICES OF THE
CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p02_01_01.asp (last
visited Aug. 6, 2011) (explaining the procedures and rules governing petitions for constitutional
interpretations); Procedure for Interpretation, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p02_01_02.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2011)
(explaining the Court’s procedures for constitutional interpretations).
90. Ssu Fa Yuan Ta Fa Kuan Shen Li An Chien Fa [Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act],
art. 7, 37 ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN 25773, 25774 (2004) (Taiwan).
91. See Chang, supra note 87, at 77 tbl.1.
92. See MINGUO XIANFA amend. 5 (2000) (Taiwan). Prior to 2003, justices were appointed for a
term of nine years with the possibility of reappointment. Under the system that was in place from
1948 to 2003, there were six distinct cohorts of justices, each of which is known as a “term” of the
Court: the first “term” was from 1948 to 1958, the second from 1958 to 1967, the third from 1967 to
1976, the fourth from 1976 to 1985, the fifth from 1985 to 1994, and the sixth from 1994 to 2003.
See Chang, supra note 88, at 203. The longest serving justice was Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng, who
joined the Court in July 1972 and left in September 2007. See Former Justices, JUSTICES OF THE
CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_04.asp (last visited
Sept. 16, 2011). Constitutional amendments adopted in 2000 introduced non-renewable eight-year
terms for the justices and also staggered their membership, with the result that it is no longer
possible to speak of a specific “term” of the Court that is defined by a fixed cohort of justices. See
MINGUO XIANFA, supra, amend. 5.
93. In order to be eligible for appointment to the Constitutional Court, a candidate must: (1) have
served as a justice of the Supreme Court for more than ten years with a distinguished record; (2)
have served as a member of the Legislative Yuan for more than nine years with distinguished
contributions; (3) have been a professor of a major field of law at a university for more than ten
years and have authored publications in a specialized field; (4) have served on the International
Court of Justice, or have published authoritative works in the fields of public or comparative law; or
(5) be a person highly reputed in the field of legal research and have political experience. In
addition, the number of justices appointed under any one of the above categories is not to exceed
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practice, however, flexible interpretation of the categories has meant that
the vast majority of those appointed have been either career judges with
prior experience on the Supreme Court or Supreme Administrative
Court, or law professors.94 Nine out of the current fifteen justices are
legal scholars; of the remainder, five are career judges, and only one is a
former private attorney.95 Very rarely are private attorneys appointed to
the Court.96
Thanks in part to the heavy representation of former academics, the
justices collectively possess impressive educational credentials and
considerable expertise in foreign law. In Taiwan, a doctorate in the form
of either a Ph.D. or J.S.D. is effectively a prerequisite to becoming a law
professor, and universities tend to value foreign legal training in
particular.97 The nine law professors currently on the Court are typical in
this regard: eight hold doctorates in law from Germany, while the last
holds a doctorate from the United States.98 In addition to these nine
one-third of the total number of justices. See Ssu Fa Yuan Tsu Chih Fa [Organic Act of the Judicial
Yuan], art. 4, para.1, 37 ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN 25399, 25400 (1957)
(Taiwan), English translation available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73. The former scholars on the
Court are in practice appointed under the third, fourth, and fifth categories, whereas the career
judges are appointed mostly under the first and fifth categories. In recent years, no justices have
been appointed under the second category (namely, legislator with more than ten years’ experience).
Because Taiwan is no longer recognized as a state by the United Nations, see supra note 73 and
accompanying text, no one from Taiwan can be appointed to the International Court of Justice, and
it has thus become impossible for anyone to be appointed to the Court under the first clause of
category four.
94. See Chang, supra note 87, at 75.
95. The current President of the Judicial Yuan and Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court was a
private attorney for about forty years prior to joining the Court. See Hau-Min Rai, JUSTICES OF THE
CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=24 (last visited Oct. 14,
2011).
96. See Chang, supra note 88, at 209–10.
97. For example, at National Taiwan University College of Law, the top law school in Taiwan,
there are at present forty full-time law professors, including associate and assistant professors.
Among them, seventeen hold doctorates from Germany, eleven from the United States, seven from
Japan, three from England, and one from France. Only one was educated entirely in Taiwan. See
Full Time Professors, NTU COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/english/full_time_professors.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2011). The
dominance of foreign-trained faculty is typical of other law schools in Taiwan as well and reflects a
combination of historical context and academic politics. See infra notes 239–246 and accompanying
text (discussing the patchwork of foreign influences that make up Taiwanese law and the
consequent habitual use of foreign law by Taiwanese scholars and judges).
98. Brief biographies of the current justices are available at the Constitutional Court’s Englishlanguage website. See Justices, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03.asp (last visited July 20, 2011). The
predominance of justices from scholarly backgrounds is a fairly recent phenomenon. Prior to the
1980s, legal scholars typically constituted from one-third to less than one-half of the Court. See
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former professors, two of the other current members of the TCC hold
foreign LL.M.s, one from Japan, the other from the United States.99
Thus, over two-thirds of the current justices have been formally trained
overseas in foreign law. Only one of the fifteen justices holds neither an
LL.M. nor a Ph.D.100
The TCC’s law clerks—one for each justice—also bring a
combination of advanced legal training and exposure to foreign law to
their work. An LL.M., either foreign or domestic, is a de facto
requirement to be hired as a clerk.101 There is no fixed term of service
for the clerks, who tend to serve for longer than just one year and are
often concurrently enrolled in domestic Ph.D. programs or preparing to
apply for Ph.D. programs overseas.102 As a result of both their length of
service and their advanced training, Taiwan’s law clerks tend to have
more experience and to know more about foreign law than their
American counterparts. Law clerk hiring turns heavily on word-ofmouth and personal recommendations: many are recommended by the
outgoing clerk or inherited from the previous justice, while justices who
are former academics often hire either their own former students or those
recommended by their former law school colleagues.103
As of this writing, the TCC has rendered a total of nearly seven
hundred constitutional interpretations over the course of its existence.104
The bulk of these decisions postdate the democratization and
constitutional reforms of the late 1980s.105 The Court currently issues
Chang, supra note 88, at 75; Former Justices, JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_04.asp (last visited July 20, 2011) (listing all
former justices).
99. See
Pi-Hu
Hsu,
JUSTICES
OF
THE
CONST.
CT.,
JUD.
YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=34 (last visited July 19,
2011) (listing an LL.M. from Columbia Law School); Hau-Min Rai, supra note 95 (listing an LL.M.
from the University of Tokyo).
100. See
Chi-Ming
Chih,
JUSTICES
OF
THE
CONST.
CT.,
JUD.
YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=88 (last visited Sept. 20,
2011).
101. See Interview with Clerk 1, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 17, 2010).
102. See id. (noting that the justice for whom she works has had a total of four clerks in seven
years).
103. For example, upon her graduation from the graduate program of National Taiwan University
College of Law, Professor Chang was hired as a law clerk to former Chief Justice Yueh-Sheng
Weng, who was a professor at National Taiwan University College of Law and continued to serve
as an adjunct professor there.
104. As of September 20, 2011, it had rendered 689 interpretations. See Interpretations, JUSTICES
OF THE CONST. CT., JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp (last
visited Sept. 20, 2011).
105. The TCC rendered 79 constitutional interpretations in its first term (1948–1958), 43 in its
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about twenty to thirty constitutional interpretations per year, of which
roughly one-quarter to one-third result in a finding of
unconstitutionality.106 The TCC has been praised by many for
facilitating Taiwan’s relatively smooth and rapid transition to
democracy, and for proving itself a strong guardian of individual rights
and freedoms.107
E.

The Growing Isolation of Taiwan’s Judges

China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan—both literally and figuratively a
small island of democracy—are not merely disheartening, but also
stunningly comprehensive. The dwindling handful of countries with
which Taiwan still enjoys diplomatic relations108 are the few remaining
places in the world where the Justices of the Constitutional Court can
expect a red-carpet welcome. South Africa under apartheid was one such
country; visiting members of the TCC attended a party in their honor
with members of the South African Constitutional Court and were even
treated to a tour of the country.109 Today, the members of the TCC can
still look forward to a warm welcome if they visit Panama or Burkina
Faso. But such hospitality is disappearing in tandem with Taiwan’s
diplomatic relations.
Membership in international organizations also poses challenges for
the TCC and its justices. Last year, for example, the Association of
Asian Constitutional Court Judges established a new organization, the
Association of Asian Constitutional Courts.110 Much of the impetus for
the formation of this organization came reportedly from members of the
South Korean Constitutional Court, one of whom contacted a member of
the TCC.111 The TCC did not receive an actual invitation to join the new
second term (1958–1967), 24 in its third term (1967–1976), 53 in its fourth term (1976–1985), 167
in its fifth term (1985–1994), and 200 in its sixth term (1994–2003). The cohort of justices
appointed in 2003 has thus far rendered an additional 119 interpretations. See Chang, supra note 87,
at 77 tbl.1.
106. See Chang, supra note 87, at 85 tbl.5.
107. See GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 144–57; Chang, supra note 87, at 83–85.
108. See supra note 66.
109. See Interview with Justice D, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010); Interview with Justice E, Current or Former
Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 3, 2010).
110. See Rule of Law Programme Asia, KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG,
http://www.kas.de/rspa/en/events/41710/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2011) (noting the adoption of the
“Jakarta Declaration” establishing the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts).
111. A subsequent interview with a member of the Korean Constitutional Court confirmed the
prominent role of that court in organizing the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts. See
Interview with Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of Korea, in Seoul, Korea (July 6,
2011).
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association, however, but was merely invited to apply for membership.
Ultimately, after some internal discussion, the TCC decided not to apply,
partly for fear of the potential “embarrassment” that might result if
China were subsequently asked to participate.112 A number of justices
expressed concern that if the TCC were to join first under its proper
name, the “Constitutional Court of the Republic of China,” and then
China were to join subsequently, China might insist that the TCC be
forced to participate under a different name or ejected from the
organization entirely, a possibility that they wished to avoid.113
Participation by individual justices in international associations and
conferences is no less problematic. As one justice glumly remarked,
China’s unrelenting exertion of pressure on other countries makes it
“hard for us to attend conferences.”114 In many cases, they are simply
not invited. The website for the latest World Congress of Constitutional
Justice, for example, proudly boasts the participation of no fewer than
eighty-eight constitutional courts and ten regional court associations.115
Yet not only was no one from the TCC invited, but the justices who
relayed this fact to us reported that they had not even heard of the event
until we asked them about it.116 One of the justices deemed Taiwan’s
exclusion unsurprising in light of the fact that the conference was hosted
by the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil and sponsored by the Venice
Commission of the Council of Europe, neither of which is keen to
complicate relations with China. Even if there are no political barriers to
Taiwanese participation in a particular gathering of judges, however, a
small country such as Taiwan is easily overlooked or ignored by the
112. See Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 18, 2010); Interview with Justice I, Current or Former
Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010); Interview
with Justice I, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei,
Taiwan (Dec. 18, 2010); Interview with Judicial Administrator in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 25, 2010).
The justices were also aware that Japan had already decided not to join, although its reasons for
declining were not known.
113. See, e.g., Interview with Justice A, supra note 112; Interview with Justice I, supra note 112.
Ultimately, neither Taiwan nor China joined the association. See The Statute of the Association of
Asian
Constitutional
Courts
and
Equivalent
Institutions,
available
at
http://www.venice.coe.int/AACCEI/AACCEI_Statute.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
114. Interview with Justice B, Current or Former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 19, 2010).
115. See List of Participants, 2ND CONG. WORLD CONF. ON CONST. JUST. (last updated Jan. 30,
2011),
http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Rio/WCCJ_List_of_Participants.pdf
(listing
the
representatives of the eighty-eight constitutional courts and ten regional court associations that
participated in the January 2011 meeting).
116. See E-mail from Justice A, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic
of China, to David S. Law (Feb. 27, 2011, 08:29 CST); E-mail from Justice H, Current or Former
Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, to David S. Law (Mar. 1, 2011, 03:14 CST).
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organizers of such events.117
In other cases, the justices may literally be turned away at the border.
In 1983, for example, a number of judges from Taiwan—including at
least one member of the Constitutional Court—arrived in Egypt to attend
a meeting of the International Association of Judges. The group was not
allowed to clear immigration and was forced to turn back.118 Another
justice met a similar fate when she attempted to attend the 2004 biannual
meeting of the International Association of Women Judges held in
Uganda. All of the Taiwanese judges were denied entry visas, reportedly
because China had offered to fund construction of a new building for the
Ugandan judiciary and had made clear its desire that the Taiwanese
delegation be barred from attending.119
Indeed, China hounds Taiwan so thoroughly and relentlessly that it
even interferes with the ability of law professors to participate in a
private capacity in international academic meetings and organizations
that are not sponsored by or affiliated with any government. One justice
related the story of how an international conference organized by Pitman
Potter, a distinguished scholar of Chinese law at the University of
British Columbia, fell victim to a Chinese boycott just two days before it
was scheduled to begin. Potter had invited scholars from both China and
Taiwan to Canada, but the Chinese government would not allow its own
scholars to attend an “international” conference if scholars from Taiwan
would also be present.120 The fact that the justices call upon local
scholars for foreign legal expertise121 and are frequently former
academics themselves122 means that such efforts to isolate Taiwanese
law professors reinforce the isolation of the TCC as well.
Even more striking was the expulsion of Taiwan’s national
117. A case in point is Yale Law School’s oft-noted global constitutionalism seminar, now in its
sixteenth year, which brings together constitutional judges from around the world on an invitationonly basis for closed-door discussions. See sources cited supra note 43. On only one occasion—in
1997—has a member of the TCC participated, and our interviewees knew of only one other justice
who had ever been invited.
118. Interview with Justice E, supra note 109.
119. Interview with Justice I, supra note 112.
120. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; see also E-mail from Pitman Potter, Hong Kong
Bank Chair in Asian Research and Professor of Law, Univ. of B.C., to David S. Law (Apr. 27,
2011, 09:49 PST) (on file with authors). Chinese authorities indicated that holding the conference in
Canada would impermissibly “internationalize” the issue of cross-strait relations, and that Chinese
scholars would be permitted to attend such a conference only if it were to be held in China or
Taiwan. Id.; see also Pitman B. Potter, Preface to LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
MAINLAND AND TAIWAN, at iii, vi (Pitman B. Potter ed., 2006) (alluding to this incident).
121. See infra text accompanying note 208 (discussing the TCC’s practice of convening
informational sessions with academics).
122. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
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association of constitutional law professors from the International
Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) in 1999.123 Yueh-Sheng
Weng, a longtime member of the National Taiwan University law
faculty and at that time Chief Justice of the TCC, had been tapped to
serve on the executive committee of the IACL in advance of the
organization’s fifth congress in Rotterdam. Unable to attend the meeting
at which he was to be formally elected, Weng designated Tzong-Li Hsu,
a colleague at National Taiwan University who would later be appointed
to the TCC himself, to travel to Rotterdam and attend the meeting in
Weng’s place.124 At the meeting, however, China’s representative on the
executive committee objected angrily to Weng’s selection on the ground
that Taiwan was not a country and that Taiwan’s so-called national
association of constitutional scholars was therefore ineligible to belong
to the IACL.125 Hsu countered that the IACL was a private scholarly
association, not the United Nations, and that Taiwan deserved to be
included in an organization dedicated to the study of constitutionalism,
given its own status as a constitutional democracy.126 The Chinese
position prevailed, however, and not only was Weng denied a seat on the
executive committee, but Taiwan’s national association was expelled
from the organization, with the result that all scholars from Taiwan lost
their membership in the IACL.127 Subsequent changes in leadership at
the IACL enabled a handful to apply successfully for membership on an
individual basis,128 but most no longer belong to the organization,129 and
Chinese harassment of the few Taiwanese scholars who do remain

123. For a description of the International Association of Constitutional Law, see INT’L ASS’N
CONST. L., http://www.iacl-aidc.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
124. Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 12, 2010); Interview with Justice C, Current or Former Justice,
Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010).
125. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
126. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
127. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice C, Current or Former
Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 4, 2011); Interview
with Dennis T.C. Tang, Dir. and Distinguished Research Professor, Institutum Iurisprudentiae, in
Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 4, 2011); Interview with Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Distingushed Professor, National
Taiwan University College of Law, in Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 6, 2011). If Taiwan were to be
considered part of China—as the Chinese scholars argued to the executive committee—then
Taiwanese scholars could, in theory, seek continued membership in the IACL via the Chinese
national association. To the best of our knowledge, however, no one from Taiwan has ever
attempted to join the Chinese association.
128. Professor Chang joined the IACL as an individual member in 2005.
129. One prominent scholar reports that his application for individual membership, filed shortly
after the expulsion of the Taiwanese national association, was never even acknowledged by the
IACL.
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continues in other forms.130
One might think that China is especially anxious to prevent
Taiwanese judges (and academics) from attending “international”
gatherings because such attendance implies that Taiwan is a “nation.”
But the obstacles that China has erected to J2J interaction involving
Taiwanese judges are by no means limited to international meetings.
Efforts by the members of the TCC to visit constitutional courts in other
countries have also been frustrated by Chinese interference. The justices
ordinarily receive a travel budget that enables them to visit courts in
other countries for research purposes; the choice of destination is left to
them, and in a typical year, a group of three or four justices will make
use of the summer recess to visit a constitutional court that they find of
particular interest or relevance to their work.131 Some countries, such as
Australia,132 Hungary,133 and South Korea,134 were identified as
relatively hospitable and trouble-free destinations, at least for a lucky
few justices. It has also been “no problem” for the justices to visit
Germany, although one justice warned that revelation of this fact might
elicit “protests” from China.135
In other countries, however, the welcome mat is nowhere to be found.
A former Chief Justice of the TCC told of many such stories. On one
occasion, for example, he had been invited to Argentina in his capacity
as President of the Judicial Yuan, only to be denied a visa.136 On another
130. At the 1999 meeting, Chinese professors shadowed and eavesdropped upon gatherings of
Taiwanese professors. Most recently, at the IACL congress held in Mexico City in December 2010,
Jiunn-Rong Yeh of National Taiwan University was selected as a last-minute substitute to appear on
a panel concerning the universality or particularity of constitutional principles. Neither the topic of
the panel nor Yeh’s relatively abstract and jurisprudential presentation, witnessed by both authors of
this Article, touched in any discernible way upon any question relating to either Taiwanese
statehood or Taiwan’s relationship with China. During the question period, the chair of the session
noted that there were still many in the audience waiting to pose questions during the little time
remaining before recognizing Jihong Mo, a law professor at the government-run Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences and member of the IACL executive committee. See Brief Introduction of Mo
Jihong, VIITH WORLD CONG. INT’L ASS’N CONST. L.,
http://www.enelsyn.gr/en/CV/Mo_Jihong.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). Mo proceeded to filibuster
for most of the remaining time with an irrelevant, incoherent, and rambling question that boiled
down to a contention that Professor Yeh lacked standing to address questions of constitutional law
because Taiwan is not a country.
131. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; Interview with Clerk 2, Law Clerk to a Justice of
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 17, 2010).
132. Interview with Justice I, supra note 112; Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note
112.
133. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
134. Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131 (describing an official reception held at the South
Korean Constitutional Court for visitors from the TCC).
135. Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
136. See id.
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occasion, when he sought to visit Brazil, he was issued a visa but
instructed not to visit the capital of Brasilia because the Chinese prime
minister would be there at the same time.137 In some cases, unwilling
hosts have resorted to face-saving avoidance techniques. For example,
although judicial visits to France do occur, such visits pose “some
difficulties,”138 and it appears that the French have on occasion found
“diplomatic” ways of thwarting them139: the justices might be told that a
visit to the Conseil Constitutionnel would require approval by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs140 or that the officials needed to authorize
passage through France happen to be on vacation.141
Similar episodes occurred in nearby Italy and Spain when a group of
justices attempted in 2006 to visit the Italian and Spanish Constitutional
Courts. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was told that a visit to the
Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) could not be arranged because the
entire court would be on vacation. After various efforts were made
through unofficial channels to prod the ICC, the Taiwanese justices
finally received word from an Italian academic that a visit to the ICC
would in fact be possible, and that the Italian justices might even meet
them. Ultimately, however, they did not meet any of their Italian
counterparts but instead received a tour of the building and met with the
ICC’s general secretary who, although “very friendly,” was unable to
answer all of their questions.142 By contrast, the trip to the Spanish
Constitutional Court promised greater success, at least initially. Word
had been relayed through a Spanish law professor that the justices
themselves would receive the visitors at the court itself.143 Upon their
actual arrival at the court, however, the Taiwanese justices were told that
the Spanish justices were too busy to meet them, and they were left
instead in the care of a retired chief justice.144 Yet even this meeting
might not have been possible had it not been for the academic contacts
that one of the Taiwanese justices possessed at a university in Madrid.145
Nor are countries with close historical or political ties to Taiwan
137. See id.
138. Interview with Justice L, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Jan. 18, 2011).
139. Interview with Spouse of Justice L, in Taipei, Taiwan (Jan. 18, 2011).
140. See Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 112.
141. See Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
142. Interview with Justice H, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Jan. 10, 2011). According to another justice, the TCC delegation also met
a retired justice. See Interview with Justice G, supra note 19.
143. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124.
144. See id.; Interview with Justice H, supra note 142.
145. See Interview with Justice H, supra note 142.
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necessarily more receptive to Taiwanese visitors. Notwithstanding its
primary responsibility for shaping Taiwan’s current legal system over
five decades of colonial rule, Japan now keeps Taiwanese judges at a
wary distance. Japanese judges and officials were described as
“generally unwilling to meet” with Taiwanese visiting judges and more
concerned with the state of their relations with China than with their
former colony.146 The fact that some Taiwanese judges have obtained
advanced degrees in Japan and thus know some Japanese judges
personally, particularly those on the Japanese administrative courts,
means that judge-to-judge contact remains possible at least on an
unofficial, individual basis.147 On the whole, however, visitors from the
TCC are “not as welcome there” as in other countries.148 TCC justices
who wished to visit the Japanese Supreme Court were reportedly told
that their Japanese counterparts could not greet them at the court itself,
and a dinner meeting at a restaurant was arranged instead.149 If visitors
from the TCC are received at the Japanese Supreme Court at all, it is
generally by administrative officials or, at best, retired justices.150
Members of the TCC have generally, but not always, enjoyed better
luck when attempting to visit Taiwan’s closest and most important ally,
the United States. A number of justices reported that they found it
unproblematic to visit the United States, and when they have traveled to
the U.S. Supreme Court, they have been met with hospitality. One
Taiwanese justice recalled how, on his first visit to the U.S. Supreme
Court over the summer of 1998, he and his colleagues from Taiwan were
informed that their American counterparts were on vacation and thus
unable to greet them.151 Instead, they were entertained at the Court by
retired Chief Justice Burger, who served them afternoon tea, regaled
them with stories about his grandfather’s dealings with the Qing
Dynasty, and even praised the European model of judicial review as
superior to the American model.152 Nevertheless, diplomatic obstacles
can still interfere with judicial visits to the United States. On one
occasion, while passing through the United States en route to Guatemala
in his official capacity as head of the Judicial Yuan, Chief Justice Weng
146. See Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 112.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See Interview with Clerk 5, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010).
150. See Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131; Interview with Clerk 8, Law Clerk to a Justice
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010).
151. See Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
152. See id.
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was reportedly warned by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to
set foot in Washington, D.C., although New York was deemed
acceptable.153 On subsequent official visits to Honduras and Panama,
however, Weng was once again allowed to stop en route in the nation’s
capital. Indeed, when he visited the Supreme Court en route to Panama,
he was greeted by Justices O’Connor and Scalia and had his picture
taken by the Court’s official photographer with Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kennedy.154 For reasons that should by now be clear,
Taiwan’s justices do not take such courtesies for granted, and the
photograph is on display in the Judicial Yuan.
As difficult as it can be for Taiwan’s judges to attend international
meetings or visit courts in other countries, playing the part of host can
pose even greater challenges. Inviting justices from other countries to
Taiwan is, in the words of one TCC justice, “very hard.”155
Notwithstanding Germany’s willingness to accept Taiwanese justices as
visitors, reciprocal visits on the part of the Germans have proved harder:
the President of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, for example,
indicated with regret that it would be “difficult” for political reasons to
accept the TCC’s invitation,156 and a number of justices reported that
their success in inviting German constitutional jurists had been limited to
retirees.157 On this count, the members of the U.S. Supreme Court have
proved braver: Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia—who is no
great fan of global judicial dialogue158—have all visited the TCC.159
Even when dealing with the U.S. Supreme Court, however, the
Taiwanese justices are wary of extending official invitations for fear that
they are more likely to be rebuffed. For this reason, efforts to bring
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
156. Interview with Clerk 3, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010).
157. See, e.g., Interview with Justice J, supra note 40; Interview with Judicial Administrator,
supra note 112.
158. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859–60 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(protesting that “the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may
think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution”).
159. Justice O’Connor and her husband visited the TCC on September 5, 1987, and Justice
Kennedy visited the TCC on September 6, 1994. Professor Chang acted as Justice Scalia’s translator
during his visit to the TCC on September 19, 2002. Their visits are chronicled in Chinese on the
TCC’s website. See Da Shi Ji Yao [Summary of Major Events], JUSTICES OF THE CONST. CT., JUD.
YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p08.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); see also
Jimmy Chuang, US Supreme Court Justice Scalia Gives Taipei Speech, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 14,
2002, at 2, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/09/14/0000167980
(describing Justice Scalia’s visit).
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Justice Souter to Taipei were conducted via a professor at Harvard,
although the invitation was ultimately declined.160
The TCC’s ties to the outside world are bolstered to some extent by
the fact that the former law professors on the court possess an
international network of academic connections, which they frequently
employ in addition to, or in lieu of, official efforts by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to orchestrate visits abroad.161 For example, when the
Chief Justice needed to pass through Paris in order to reach Burkina
Faso as part of a diplomatic delegation, the Ministry reported difficulty
obtaining the necessary clearance, ostensibly because the trip was
occurring close to Christmas and the relevant French officials were on
vacation.162 The Chief Justice ultimately solved the problem by
contacting a French law professor he knew who, in turn, managed to set
the bureaucracy in motion.163
These backdoor efforts are at best partially successful, however, as
illustrated by the recent trips to Italy164 and Spain.165 In an effort to
salvage the visit to the Italian Constitutional Court, one former law
professor on the TCC wrote no fewer than thirty-eight letters and e-mails
to professors in Italy and elsewhere, and to judges outside of Italy, in the
hope that word of mouth might encourage the Italian justices to meet
with the Taiwanese group, and it initially seemed that this
correspondence campaign might bear fruit.166 Similarly, it was a former
professor on the TCC who initially secured the Spanish Constitutional
Court’s agreement to greet the Taiwanese justices by calling upon his
academic contacts.167 Yet the justices from Taiwan were ultimately
unable to meet active members of either court.168 The effectiveness of
academic backchannels as a means of overcoming Taiwan’s isolation is
limited by China’s constant, petty efforts to prevent Taiwanese
160. See Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
161. An example of a country where the TCC has enjoyed unofficial academic connections in
addition to official contact is South Korea. Although the Korean Constitutional Court did not balk at
hosting an official reception for visiting members of the TCC, a number of the former academics on
the TCC also visit South Korea routinely in their capacity as professors under the auspices of the
Dong Ya Fa Xue Hui, or East Asian Legal Studies Association, which has been in operation for over
a decade. See Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 156.
162. See Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
163. See id.
164. See supra text accompanying note 142.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 143–44.
166. See Interview with Justice H, supra note 142.
167. See Interview with Justice A, supra note 124.
168. See id.; Interview with Justice H, supra note 142; Interview with Judicial Administrator,
supra note 112.
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professors from participating in international events.169
F.

A Statistical Analysis of Foreign Law Citation by Taiwan’s
Constitutional Court

The published opinions of the TCC give the superficial appearance of
a court that makes relatively little use of foreign law. Actual citation of
foreign law is rare, especially in majority opinions. Analysis of every
constitutional interpretation rendered by the TCC from January 1949 to
June 2008—a total of 644 interpretations in all170—reveals that in only
four cases (0.62%) did the opinion of the court explicitly cite a foreign
judicial decision,171 and in only eight cases (1.4%) did the majority
opinion explicitly cite a foreign constitution or statute.172 Citations to
foreign law were much more common, but still not routine, among the
554 concurring and dissenting opinions authored by individual justices:
74 of these separate opinions (13.4%) cited foreign precedent and
another 121 (21.8%) cited foreign constitutions or statutes.
The foreign judicial decisions cited by the TCC originated mostly
from Germany (206 citations distributed over 173 opinions), the United
States (75 citations distributed over 65 opinions), Japan (40 citations
distributed over 37 opinions), and the European Court of Justice and
European Court of Human Rights (a total of 7 citations distributed over
6 opinions). Decisions from France, Austria, Turkey, Canada, Hungary,
Italy, Switzerland, the Philippines, and South Korea were also cited from

169. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (describing the travails associated with the
participation of Taiwanese legal scholars in international academic organizations and gatherings
when Chinese academics are also present).
170. The authors are particularly grateful to Professor Jiunn-Rong Yeh for his generous
permission to use findings from the research that he conducted in conjunction with one of the
authors in an earlier collaboration. See Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, The Explicit and
Implicit Use of Foreign Precedents by the Constitutional Court in Taiwan, Presentation at the VIIIth
World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law (Dec. 8, 2010). For further
information about the collaborative, cross-national research effort of which this study of Taiwan
formed a part, see Cross-Judicial Fertilization—the Use of Foreign precedents by Constitutional
Judges, INT’L ASS’N OF CONST. L., http://www.iacl-aidc.org/?page_id=54 (last visited Sept. 19,
2011).
171. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 499, 13 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Mar. 24, 2000); J.Y. Interpretation
No. 392, 7 SHIZI 377 (Const. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995); J.Y. Interpretation No. 342, 6 SHIZI 124 (Const.
Ct. Apr. 8, 1994); J.Y. Interpretation No. 165, 2 SHIZI 214 (Council Grand J. Sept. 12, 1980).
172. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 632, 20 SHIZI 321 (Const. Ct. Aug. 15, 2007); J.Y. Interpretation
No. 617, 19 SHIZI 341 (Const. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006); J.Y. Interpretation No. 601, 18 SHIZI 335 (Const.
Ct. July 22, 2005); J.Y. Interpretation No. 587, 17 SHIZI 826 (Const. Ct. Dec. 30, 2004); J.Y.
Interpretation No. 582, 17 SHIZI 519 (Const. Ct. July 23, 2004); J.Y. Interpretation No. 419, 8 SHIZI
640 (Const. Ct. Dec. 31, 1996); J.Y. Interpretation No. 392, 7 SHIZI 377 (Const. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995)
J.Y. Interpretation No. 371, 7 SHIZI 26 (Const. Ct. Jan. 20, 1995).
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time to time.173 References to foreign constitutions and laws also
centered most heavily on Germany, the United States, and Japan, in that
order.
The data reveal two strong predictors of whether a justice will cite
foreign law and, if so, which country that justice will favor. First, a
justice’s prior professional background is strongly correlated with the
frequency with which he or she cites foreign law: justices who were
previously law professors cited foreign judicial decisions four times
more often than did those who were appointed from the career judiciary.
References to foreign statutes and constitutional texts, however, were
much more equally distributed between former professors and career
judges.174 Second, there is a striking link between the educational
backgrounds of the justices and the sources of foreign law that they
prefer to cite. Eighty-seven percent of the citations to German
constitutional jurisprudence and 60% of the citations to German
constitutional or statutory provisions were the work of justices who had
themselves obtained either master’s or doctoral degrees in Germany.
Similarly, justices with some form of American legal training were
responsible for 61.7% of the citations to American judicial decisions.
G.

Behind the Scenes: The Court’s Extensive Usage of Foreign Law

Citation patterns are, however, a highly unreliable indicator of the
extent to which judges actually consider foreign law.175 No court better
illustrates the perils of using foreign law citation to measure foreign law
usage than the TCC. Various justices explained that, as a matter of
“tradition,”176 “convention,”177 and “judicial style,”178 opinions for the
court are succinct and tend not to contain footnotes, which makes
citation to foreign law difficult.179 In part, this style of opinion-writing
reflects a feeling shared by some academics and justices that “official”

173. France and Austria were each cited a total of three times over the course of three different
opinions. Turkey was cited a total of two times in a total of two opinions. Canada, Hungary, Italy,
Switzerland, the Philippines, and South Korea were each cited once.
174. Most citations of foreign judicial precedent are the work of justices from scholarly
backgrounds (325 citations) as opposed to career judges (84 citations). By contrast, references to
foreign constitutional provisions and statutes are equally common among former scholars (259
citations) and career judges (249 citations).
175. See supra note 38.
176. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19.
177. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
178. Interview with Justice J, supra note 40.
179. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice B, supra note 114;
Interview with Justice G, supra note 19; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131.
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documents should not contain citations,180 and that it is “harder to justify
mentioning foreign law in opinions” when “we feel we are writing for
the country.”181 When exceptions to this unwritten rule against citation
of foreign law are made, they are more likely to occur in those rare cases
of unusual importance where oral argument is held.182 By comparison,
separate opinions are more likely to contain explicit references to foreign
law because they are free to assume a “less rigid” form.183 A distinction
also exists between foreign and international law: treaties and other
international legal instruments, such as the various United Nations
covenants, are more likely to be cited than the domestic law of other
countries.184
For these reasons, failure to cite foreign law does not denote failure to
consider foreign law.185 One justice offered by way of example a recent
high-profile case concerning the detention of former president Chen
Shui-Bian pending his trial on corruption charges. The TCC ultimately
adopted a multi-part test drawn from German law that already resembled
existing doctrine in Taiwan. Instead of acknowledging the test’s German
provenance, however, the justices instead “digested” the German
180. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
181. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19. We also asked several justices whether the
reluctance to cite foreign law might be attributable in part to a separate opinion by Justice Herbert
Ma in an important separation-of-powers case that had criticized the majority opinion’s citation of
foreign law. Ma’s opinion argued, inter alia, that foreign law should only be cited in footnotes, if at
all, and only for the purpose of providing additional examples in support of a proposition already
established as a matter of domestic law. See J.Y. Interpretation 342, 6 SHIZI 124 (Const. Ct. Apr. 8,
1994), English translation available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=342.
The
justices
we
interviewed rejected the notion that Justice Ma’s opinion had discouraged others from citing foreign
law; one justice said, quite bluntly, that Justice Ma’s views on citation of foreign law had been
“ignored.” Interview with Justice D, supra note 109; see also Interview with Justice J, supra note
40. Our empirical analysis of the TCC’s opinions from 1949 to 2008 shows, moreover, that citations
to foreign law have actually become slightly more common since Justice Ma’s opinion appeared in
1994. As another justice observed, however, even if Justice Ma’s opinion itself did not lead to
modification of the TCC’s citation practices, it did express a view held by some academics and
justices. See Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
182. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124. As of this writing, the TCC has held oral argument
in only six cases, the most recent of which was decided in 2005: J.Y. Interpretation No. 603, 18
SHIZI 456 (Const. Ct. Sept. 28, 2005); J.Y. Interpretation No. 585, 17 SHIZI 723 (Const. Ct. Dec. 15,
2004); J.Y. Interpretation No. 445, 10 SHIZI 15 (Const. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998); J.Y. Interpretation No.
419, 8 SHIZI 640 (Const. Ct. Dec. 31, 1996); J.Y. Interpretation No. 392, 7 SHIZI 377 (Const. Ct.
Dec. 22, 1995); J.Y. Interpretation No. 334, 6 SHIZI 17 (Const. Ct. Jan. 14, 1994).
183. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
184. Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131.
185. The TCC is by no means the only constitutional court that makes a habit of considering, but
not citing, foreign law. See supra note 63 (noting that the Japanese Supreme Court and Korean
Constitutional Court tend not to cite foreign law in their opinions, even when it has actually been
taken into account).
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approach “into our own language.”186 The TCC’s decisions are rife with
examples of such adoption of foreign approaches without explicit
citation or acknowledgment. Proportionality analysis,187 the concepts of
substantive and procedural due process,188 the political question
doctrine,189 the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions on expression,190 and heightened scrutiny of suspect
classifications in equality cases191 are among the many recognizable but
unlabeled foreign imports to be found in the TCC’s jurisprudence.
In fact, comparative constitutional analysis is virtually automatic
practice for a majority of the justices, even if there is usually no telltale
indication of the scope of their foreign legal research. Typical was the
view expressed by one former academic on the Court that the justices
“consult foreign constitutional materials” in “almost every case.”192
Another justice—also a former academic—estimated that they consider
foreign law “ninety-plus percent” of the time, and he further described
the rare exceptions as cases in which foreign law will obviously not be
186. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19.
187. The principle of proportionality first appeared in J.Y. Interpretation No. 471, 10 SHIZI 456
(Const.
Ct.
Dec.
18,
1998),
English
translation
available
at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=471, and was later fully
elaborated in J.Y. Interpretation No. 476, 11 SHIZI 59 (Const. Ct. Jan. 29, 1999), English translation
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=476. Since then,
proportionality has become a standard feature of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence as well as
in other areas of law. See CHANG-FA LO, THE LEGAL CULTURE AND SYSTEM OF TAIWAN 61–62
(2006).
188. The concepts of substantive and procedural due process were first introduced in J.Y.
Interpretation No. 384, 7 SHIZI 226 (Const. Ct. July 28, 1995), and have since appeared in many
other interpretations. See, e.g., J.Y. Interpretation No. 670, 24 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Jan. 29, 2010);
J.Y. Interpretation No. 664, 23 SHIZI 17 (Const. Ct. July 31, 2009) ; J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21
SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 2008); J.Y. Interpretation No. 588, 18 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005);
J.Y. Interpretation No. 567, 16 SHIZI 233 (Const. Ct. Oct. 24, 2003); J.Y. Interpretation No. 535, 14
SHIZI 357 (Const. Ct. Dec. 14, 2001); J.Y. Interpretation No. 471, 10 SHIZI 456 (Const. Ct. Dec. 18,
1998); Interpretation No. 392, 7 SHIZI 377 (Const. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995).
189. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 328, 5 SHIZI 481 (Const. Ct. Nov. 26, 1993), English translation
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=328.
190. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 678, 25 SHIZI 26 (Const. Ct. July 2, 2010) (regarding access to
media); J.Y. Interpretation No. 623, 20 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Jan. 26, 2007) (regarding obscene
speech); J.Y. Interpretation No. 617, 19 SHIZI 341 (Const. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006); J.Y. Interpretation No.
577, 17 SHIZI 319 (Const. Ct. May 7, 2004) (regarding commercial speech); Interpretation No. 509,
13 SHIZI 298 (Const. Ct. July 7, 2000) (regarding defamatory speech); J.Y. Interpretation No. 445,
10 SHIZI 15 (Const. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998); J.Y. Interpretation No. 414, 8 SHIZI 578 (Const. Ct. Nov. 8,
1996); J.Y. Interpretation No. 407, 8 SHIZI 369 (Const. Ct. July 5, 1996).
191. See, e.g., J.Y. Interpretation No. 666, 23 SHIZI 200 (Const. Ct. Nov. 6, 2009), English
translation available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=666
(indicating that the principle of equality requires a “substantive nexus” between the “legislative
purpose” and any distinctions drawn in the law).
192. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124.
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relevant or useful, such as a separation-of-powers case involving the
Examination Yuan, one of the five branches of a convoluted
governmental structure that is wholly unique to the R.O.C.
Constitution.193
Even justices who use foreign law infrequently by the standards of the
TCC still use it frequently in absolute terms. The most conservative
estimate of foreign law usage was given by a law clerk who indicated
that the justice for whom he works, a career judge, partakes of foreign
law in one or two out of every six cases. Most, but not all, of the justices
and clerks opined that those appointed from the career judiciary tend to
be more “skeptical” of the value and relevance of foreign law.194 The
justices who were not themselves former academics tended to be more
circumspect about the extent to which they consult foreign law, saying
only that “it depends on the case,”195 or that they engage in comparative
research “only if we think there is relevant foreign law to guide us.”196
All agreed, however, that consulting foreign constitutional materials was
simply not controversial, and that there is no meaningful connection
between a justice’s political ideology and his or her willingness to
consider foreign law. As one clerk observed: “Conservatives use foreign
law too. They all use it.”197
The law clerks described an even greater degree of exposure to
foreign law than the justices. When hired, they are often told that their
“primary responsibility” will be “comparative legal research.”198 It is up
to each justice how to select his or her sole law clerk. However, an
LL.M. is a de facto hiring requirement, and many of the clerks receive
part or all of their graduate-level legal training overseas.199 In addition,
some justices seek to hire clerks with strength in a particular language,
typically either English or German, that will be helpful for research
purposes.200 Approximately 90% of the petitions received by the TCC
193. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
194. Compare Interview with Justice C, supra note 124, and Interview with Clerk 6, Law Clerk
to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 25, 2010),
and Interview with Clerk 8, supra note 150 (indicating that career judges are less inclined to use
foreign law), with Interview with Justice B, supra note 114, and Interview with Clerk 3, supra note
156 (arguing that career judges are no less inclined to use foreign law).
195. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19.
196. Interview with Justice I, supra note 112.
197. Interview with Clerk 5, supra note 149.
198. Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131.
199. Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101.
200. Of the justices who make a point of hiring clerks with particular linguistic aptitudes, some
justices seek out clerks who can compensate for their own weakness in a particular language, see
Interview with Justice J, supra note 40, while other justices prefer clerks who share the same
linguistic strengths as they do, in order to help them research the law of countries that they already
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are dismissed without a ruling on the merits and thus do not call for the
clerks to perform foreign legal research.201 With respect to the 10% that
the Court decides to hear, however, comparative legal research is “the
most basic thing” that the clerks do and is required “probably 100% of
the time.”202 The clerks also reported that analysis of the TCC’s own
precedent typically comprises only a “very small portion” of the reports
that they prepare for the justices on each case; the “vast majority” of the
typical report is foreign legal research.203 Foreign constitutional law is
taken so seriously, in fact, that the Taiwanese judiciary itself publishes
and sells hardbound Chinese translations of the case law of those
constitutional courts that are considered most influential in Taiwan—
namely, the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht
and, most recently, the European Court of Human Rights, but no longer
the Japanese Supreme Court.204 These translations are available to the
general public and find their way into library collections throughout
Taiwan including those of the justices themselves.

tend to consult most frequently, see Interview with Clerk 9, Law Clerk to a Justice of the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010).
201. See Interview with Clerk 4, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010).
202. Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 156.
203. Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131.
204. See Interview with Justice J, supra note 40; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131;
Interview with Clerk 4, supra note 201. The Judicial Yuan’s recent discontinuation of the
translation of Japanese Supreme Court decisions was attributed to a combination of a “lack of
resources,” Interview with Justice B, supra note 114, and the fact that the influence of the Japanese
Supreme Court on Taiwanese constitutional law is “obviously declining, severely.” Interview with
Clerk 2, supra note 131. This decline was attributed, in turn, to a variety of mutually reinforcing
factors. One is the growing willingness and greater ability on the part of the justices to “cut out the
middleman” and look directly to U.S. and German law, from which Japanese constitutional
jurisprudence borrows heavily. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; accord Interview with
Clerk 2, supra note 131. Another is the fact that few of the current justices or clerks have Japanese
legal training, which both reflects and accelerates the decline of Japanese influence. Third, and most
interestingly, is a growing sense that the Japanese Supreme Court is simply too conservative and too
willing to uphold government action for its decisions to be of continuing interest or use to the TCC.
On the increasingly rare occasions that a justice attempts to argue in favor of the (invariably
conservative) Japanese approach, other justices will now object that Japan is “not really an open,
free country,” that there is consequently “no need to look at what they’re saying,” Interview with
Clerk 5, supra note 149, and that Taiwan ought to look to “more advanced or progressive
countries.” Interview with Clerk 6, supra note 194; accord Interview with Clerk 4, supra note 201;
Interview with Clerk 8, supra note 150. Yet another cause, related to the immediately preceding
one, is that Japanese legal scholarship has become a substitute for Japanese case law because, as
compared to the case law, the scholarship is more “solid,” “fully developed,” and “critical” and thus
of greater use to the TCC. Interview with Clerk 4, supra note 201.
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How the Justices Do—and Do Not—Learn About Foreign Law

Not surprisingly, the result of this routine and extensive investigation
into foreign law is a constitutional court that is highly knowledgeable of
how courts elsewhere have approached similar issues, even though its
opinions tend not to reveal the scope of its knowledge. If the TCC fails
to cite or adopt another court’s approach to a particular question, it does
so out of choice, not out of ignorance. “If it’s been covered elsewhere,”
assured one clerk, “they have considered it. They might not follow [the
foreign approach], but they’ll consider it.”205 One justice explained the
situation bluntly: “We are already fully knowledgeable about foreign
law. The problem is translating this knowledge into our social and
political context.”206
But how exactly do the justices and their clerks acquire their
extensive knowledge of foreign law? It turns out that, for the most part,
they do so in very old-fashioned ways: they study it in school, they
conduct research, and they talk to their colleagues. Much of this research
concerns legal systems to which the justices and clerks have already
been exposed as graduate students: eleven of the fifteen justices hold
either an LL.M. or Ph.D. in law from another country.207 Another
important resource for the clerks when performing comparative research
is the assistance of their fellow clerks. Rather than working in isolation
for their respective justices, the clerks share offices with, and rely
heavily upon, one another, thanks in part to the fact that they
complement each other with different language skills and foreign legal
expertise. Finally, if the justices feel that they need more information on
a particular topic, they will convene an unofficial shuo ming hui, or
information-gathering session, to which they will invite academics to
discuss the topic and explain relevant foreign jurisprudence.208 These
sessions occasionally include scholars from overseas; German public
law specialists, in particular, are invited to the Court an average of once
or twice per year.209
What has transformed the way in which Taiwanese justices and clerks
learn about foreign law is not an expansion of opportunities to interact
with judges in other countries, but rather the increasing availability and
utility of electronic research tools. Their research on foreign law is now
205. Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131.
206. Interview with Justice F, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010).
207. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
208. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
209. Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 112.
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conducted “mostly” on the internet, but also through the online research
services Westlaw and Beck Online, a German equivalent.210 There are
occasions, however, when the Internet alone is not enough, and the
TCC’s inability to obtain information through formal channels can
complicate its efforts to obtain needed information. The story behind one
high-profile decision illustrates the Court’s ability to overcome such
challenges without the help of J2J dialogue, albeit in a highly
roundabout fashion.
In Interpretation No. 499, the TCC struck down as unconstitutional a
constitutional amendment by which Taiwan’s National Assembly had
sought to extend its own term of office.211 Given the sensitivity and
importance of the case, the justices were keen to learn all they could
about cases in which other constitutional courts had declared
constitutional amendments unconstitutional, and the resulting decision
was one of the rare ones in which the TCC actually cited foreign law
explicitly.212 The justice assigned to write the opinion had read in a
German law journal that the Italian Constitutional Court had previously
rendered such a decision, and so he set about to obtain a copy of the
Italian decision in Chinese for the Court’s use.213 Italy’s lack of
diplomatic ties with Taiwan ruled out direct contact with the Italian
government, and a request to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for
help proved fruitless.214 Among the few states that do recognize Taiwan,
however, is the Vatican. The justice thus contacted a diplomat he knew
personally at the Holy See’s embassy in Taiwan, who promptly obtained
a copy of the decision, but in Italian. Translation of the opinion into
Chinese then proceeded on two fronts. The justice visited the nearest
Catholic church and recruited the help of its priest, who had just arrived
from Italy and did not speak Chinese, and together, the priest and the
justice prepared a translation. Meanwhile, one of the Court’s clerks
made contact over the internet with a law professor from Florence, who
partnered with the clerk to create a translation of their own.215
210. Interview with Clerk 4, supra note 201; Interview with Clerk 5, supra note 149. Although
the Court’s librarians do not help with substantive foreign legal research, they will acquire books
upon request. See Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131.
211. J.Y. Interpretation No. 499, 13 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Mar. 24, 2000), English translation
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=499.
212. See id. (citing, among others, Corte Cost., 29 dicembre 1988, n. 1146, Giur. it. 1988, I, 5565
(It.)).
213. Interview with Justice D, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic of
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Mar. 3, 2011).
214. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly responded that Italy lacks a constitutional court.
Interview with Justice D, supra note 109.
215. Id. The two unofficial translations turned out to be the same in all material respects.
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Just as important and interesting as the ways in which the justices
learn about foreign law, however, are the way ways in which they do not
learn about foreign law. Notwithstanding their tremendous knowledge
of foreign law, there are two mechanisms in particular upon which they
do not rely. One way in which they do not learn about foreign law is via
the submissions of litigants. A large proportion of petitioners to the TCC
are pro se, and of those who do have lawyers, the briefs that they file
may contain references to foreign law but are generally of “poor” quality
because, with only “one or two exceptions,” law firms in Taiwan have
no real experience with constitutional litigation.216 Nor does the Court
receive amicus briefs.217 Oral argument, meanwhile, takes place only in
unusually important, “extreme cases.”218
Another potential avenue for learning about foreign law that appears
to make little practical difference to Taiwan’s Constitutional Court is J2J
dialogue, especially of the face-to-face variety. The justices largely
rejected the suggestion that their isolation and lack of opportunities for
personal interaction with judges elsewhere has either diminished their
interest in foreign law or impaired their ability to learn adequately about
it. Tangible evidence that face-to-face interaction (or a lack thereof) has
in any way influenced the TCC’s use of foreign law is especially elusive.
One of the twelve justices interviewed did argue that face-to-face
interaction with foreign judges is “totally different” from ordinary legal
research: this justice argued that such interaction is both more focused
on “reality” (meaning candid) and more “to the point” (meaning
efficient) than what is publicly available, but no examples were
forthcoming.219 Another justice initially opined that “we can always get
216. Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101 (indicating that some briefs from the law firm of Lee
and Li are “much better”); accord Interview with Justice B, supra note 114 (identifying Lee and Li
as one of the few law firms that handles constitutional cases on a pro bono basis); Interview with
Nigel Li, Chief Exec. Officer, Lee & Li, Attorneys-at-Law, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 24, 2010)
(estimating that his firm handles perhaps ten to twelve cases per year that culminate in an actual
petition to the TCC, and that there are “maybe five or six lawyers” in Taiwan “who do this kind of
work regularly”); Interview with Wei-Chien Feng, Attorney, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 24, 2010)
(concurring in Nigel Li’s assessment of the size of the constitutional bar in Taiwan); Interview with
Clerk 2, supra note 131.
217. Interview with Justice B, supra note 114. Although the justices are apparently willing in
principle to consider amicus briefs, the Court’s formal procedures do not contemplate that parties
will file them; nor are there any organizations that attempt to do so. See Constitutional Adjudication
Procedure Act, art. 13 (1993), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73.
218. Id.
219. Interview with Justice J, supra note 40. A different justice did offer a modest example of a
piece of information, concerning the motives behind South Africa’s abolition of the death penalty,
that he did not feel he could have learned via more conventional means. This particular tidbit, which
the justice found both interesting and surprising, was a South African judge’s observation that one
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things in person that can’t be put in writing” but nevertheless concluded
that he could only speculate as to whether face-to-face dialogue was in
fact useful: in his view, it was “hard to say whether foreign justices are
in fact more open [or] forthcoming in person than in writing. But maybe
we are missing out if we don’t talk to them.”220 Still another justice
offered weakly that exchanges with foreign judges “maybe stimulate
mutual interest.”221
For the most part, however, the justices were openly skeptical that J2J
dialogue could bolster either their (already extensive) interest in
comparative analysis or their (already extensive) knowledge of foreign
law. Indeed, even the justice who expressed a fear of “missing out”
observed that contact with foreign academics was probably an adequate
substitute for contact with foreign judges: he himself “had no questions
that could be answered only by judges, not by professors,” and the fact
that so many constitutional judges are themselves former academics, as
in Germany or Taiwan, makes foreign judges and foreign academics
somewhat fungible sources of information about foreign law.222 There
are no doubt cases in which more extensive J2J dialogue would simplify
the TCC’s efforts to obtain needed information; the travails involved in
obtaining a Chinese translation of a prominent Italian decision, described
above, offer a vivid (if not necessarily representative) example.223 It
appears, however, that the improvisation and ingenuity of the Court have
proven sufficient to the challenge.
Much of the justices’ skepticism about the value of J2J dialogue
arises from their own experience with such dialogue. Most of the
justices described their encounters with foreign judges as too brief to
permit any meaningful substantive discussion of constitutional law, even
on those occasions when written questions and answers were circulated
in advance so as to facilitate deeper discussion. These encounters were
typically described as involving “maybe one hour or so for oral
discussion,”224 or what one justice colorfully dubbed “just a light dip in
the water,” with little opportunity for actual learning.225 Others
reason for the apartheid regime’s suspension of the death penalty was its fear that the Africa
National Congress might eventually engage in retaliatory executions of white political prisoners if it
took control. This justice also expressed the view that it would be easier to obtain relevant
information on international human rights conventions through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs if
Taiwan enjoyed regular diplomatic relations. Interview with Justice E, supra note 109.
220. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19.
221. Interview with Justice F, supra note 206.
222. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 211–15.
224. Interview with Justice G, supra note 19; see also Interview with Justice F, supra note 206.
225. Interview with Justice E, supra note 109.
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suggested that J2J dialogue of the formal variety involves little or no
substance at all. Asked to describe the content of his own meetings with
members of the U.S. Supreme Court, a former justice described the
discussions as “formal,” “polite,” and concerned with such “ordinary
topics” as their plans for life after retirement.226 Another longtime
member of the Court was much more blunt. “Formal interaction really
doesn’t matter,” he explained. “It’s really just social. Small talk. Doing
real comparative law research is from the books. It is absolutely not
substantive discussion. In fact, there is not even time.”227 The value of
interaction with American judges, in particular, is sharply limited by
American ignorance of foreign law: “U.S. justices,” he lamented,
“barely can tell Taiwan from Thailand.”228
Thus, on the rare occasions that the justices do engage in substantive
J2J dialogue, it is not of the glamorous variety that occurs behind closed
doors at international gatherings or prestigious law schools. Nor, for the
most part, does it even occur face-to-face. One longtime member of the
TCC observed that there were only two countries where visits would
entail meaningful substantive discussion—namely, Germany and
Austria.229 Instead, when Taiwan’s justices do engage in J2J dialogue, it
typically takes the mundane form of e-mail communication with foreign
judges to whom the justices already have personal or professional ties
stemming from their own education abroad or past experience as
academics.230 In practice, this means simply that some of the Germantrained justices e-mail questions directly to members of the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Various justices described the existence of
“generally strong personal connections” to the German court that enable
them to e-mail their German counterparts and ask, in connection with
specific cases, “from your perspective, what should we consider or look
at, what do you think?”231

226. Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
227. Interview with Justice D, supra note 109.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., Interview with Justice B, supra note 114; Interview with Justice H, supra note 142.
231. Interview with Justice C, supra note 124. One German-trained justice recalled, for example,
writing over ten e-mails to various members of the German court specializing in both public law
and criminal law in connection with a case involving the right to an interpreter in child custody
proceedings. See Interview with Justice H, supra note 142 (discussing J.Y. Interpretation 590, 18
SHIZI 90 (Const. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005), which involved the right to petition the TCC for a constitutional
interpretation in the course of a child custody hearing during which the trial court had ruled
immediately on a constitutional challenge to a statute instead of referring the constitutional question
to the TCC).
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III. THE CAUSES OF COMPARATIVISM: WHY THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT AND TAIWANESE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT APPROACH FOREIGN LAW SO DIFFERENTLY
Comparison of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court and U.S.
Supreme Court sheds considerable light upon the question of what role,
if any, J2J dialogue plays in determining the extent to which a
constitutional court will make use of foreign law. On the one hand, if J2J
dialogue on human rights issues were necessary for courts to make use
of foreign law, then a marginalized, isolated court, such as the TCC,
ought to make little or no use of foreign law. On the other hand, if J2J
dialogue does indeed whet the judicial appetite for comparative analysis,
then the U.S. Supreme Court, whose members are inundated with
opportunities to network with foreign judges, ought to be a ferocious
consumer of foreign law. Indeed, if scholarly depictions of the forms and
avenues of J2J dialogue are accurate, nowhere are the opportunities for
J2J interaction richer than at a handful of elite law schools located a
short train ride from the U.S. Supreme Court.232
Yet precisely the opposite is true. The U.S. Supreme Court has, in
fact, been singled out for criticism for its failure to participate in global
judicial dialogue.233 Even though its references to foreign law in a
handful of relatively recent high-profile constitutional cases have
attracted enormous attention,234 the use of foreign law remains anything
but routine, and it is open to dispute whether the Court is in fact making
more frequent use of foreign law than it has done in the past.235 By
232. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, at 66–67; Waters, supra note 3, at 492.
233. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 145–46 (1991) (“Except for Justice Story, who died in 1845, no American Supreme
Court justice has shown as much interest in the law of other nations as many foreign judges now do
in ours.”); L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 3, at 15, 37–38 (observing that “American judgments
almost never consider the reasoning of other courts,” and arguing that “the failure of the United
States Supreme Court to take part in the international dialogue among the courts of the world,
particularly on human rights issues, is contributing to a growing isolation and diminished
influence”).
234. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033–34 (2010) (citing a
“global consensus” against the practice of sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, and noting that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
specifically prohibits the practice); Law, supra note 1, at 653–59 (describing the controversy over
earlier references by the Court to foreign law).
235. Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 6, at 838–39 (concluding that, since 1940,
“the Supreme Court has greatly accelerated the number of references it has made to foreign law in
constitutional cases,” “especially in the area of criminal law, and in progressively more
controversial and groundbreaking cases”), and Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1323–24 (arguing that
“[t]he Supreme Court has made a conscious turn toward international judicial dialogue” in recent
years), with Zaring, supra note 2, at 299, 331 (indicating that “the Supreme Court uses less foreign
law now than it has at any other time in its history,” and finding “little evidence” that the use of
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contrast, it is difficult to imagine how any court could engage more often
in comparative analysis than the Taiwanese Constitutional Court.
Comparison of the two courts thus only reinforces the conclusion that
direct interaction between judges has relatively little impact on the
degree to which constitutional courts engage in comparative analysis.
More likely explanations for the TCC’s extensive use of foreign law
involve much deeper causes. From a functional perspective, it is unclear
whether Taiwan possesses the resources to rely exclusively upon
domestic constitutional law. Unlike the United States, Taiwan does not
possess the corpus of constitutional jurisprudence that comes with over
two centuries of experience with judicial review; indeed, it emerged
from authoritarian rule less than three decades ago.236 The relative
brevity of Taiwan’s experience with democracy means that the TCC has
less homegrown material to draw upon and thus faces a practical need to
look elsewhere for inspiration.237 Another relevant factor in Taiwan’s
case may be that of sheer size—or lack thereof. One justice went so far
as to suggest that Taiwan lacks the human capital to construct its own
jurisprudence from scratch, especially when compared to such
behemoths as Japan and the United States, each of which boasts a vastly
larger population, a correspondingly larger number of law faculties and
legal experts, and economies of scale that can support research
infrastructure along the lines of Westlaw and Lexis.238
Other explanations for the comparative leanings of the TCC are
historical and political in nature. There is simply no debate in Taiwan
over whether it is appropriate to be guided by foreign examples in
constitutional cases because Taiwan’s entire legal history has been one
of imposition and imitation. The fact that Taiwan was a Japanese colony
for half a century, and that Japan itself imported vast swaths of German
law, remains one of the biggest factors shaping the Constitutional
Court’s patterns of foreign law usage.239 Consulting foreign law is an
foreign law as an interpretive aid by the federal courts “is growing or at all vibrant”).
236. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the TCC’s role in the democratization
of Taiwan).
237. See Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 156 (identifying a lack of domestic case law as one
of the major factors that will lead the TCC to resort to foreign legal research in a particular case); cf.
Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea
and Taiwan, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 763, 790 (2002) (arguing that, because “legislatures in new
democracies are typically underdeveloped and unable to carry out what might otherwise be their
natural function of norm replacement,” “courts in democratic transitions” may end up “play[ing] a
special role of looking abroad to transform their constitutional orders”).
238. See Interview with Justice B, supra note 114.
239. Cf. Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of
(Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813, 1831–42, 1849 (finding as an empirical matter that
those who author corporate law statutes and treatises in countries that were once colonies are
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“unthinking habit” inherited from that era, if not earlier.240 Indeed, a
number of justices lamented that the construction of a genuinely
domestic constitutional jurisprudence remains a work-in-progress,
tentatively cobbled together from a variety of German, American, and
other parts that have yet to be digested into something uniquely
Taiwanese.241 At the same time, Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation creates a
political incentive for the TCC to borrow from other countries. The
justices are aware that Taiwan can generate badly needed support and
acceptance among the international community by following in the
footsteps of powerful and prestigious countries.242 Although such
considerations are not foremost in the minds of the justices,243 the fact
that they are present at all suggests that the TCC’s use of foreign
jurisprudence from such countries might be considered a form of judicial
diplomacy.
This confluence of historical and geopolitical circumstances has
created a domestic political environment in which judicial usage of
foreign law is not only uncontroversial, but potentially even
advantageous for the TCC. In especially controversial or politically
sensitive cases, observed one justice, the ability to say “this is how it’s
done elsewhere” and “we used a foreign mainstream standard” can
provide a “kind of safe harbor” from criticism that the Court is simply

disproportionately likely to have studied law in the former colonizing power or another “core
country of the same legal family”).
240. See Interview with Judicial Administrator, supra note 112.
241. See Interview with Justice B, supra note 114 (arguing that the reception of foreign law in
Taiwan has yet to undergo the equivalent of “Japanization,” wherein one takes the foreign and
makes it one’s own). Not coincidentally, the mixture of foreign components found in Taiwan’s
constitutional jurisprudence mirrors the mixture of educational backgrounds found among Taiwan’s
legal scholars, the vast majority of whom are trained in Germany, the United States, Japan, and
England. See supra note 98.
242. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1178, 1181–82 (2011) (arguing that “constitutional
conformity” is an “attractive” strategy for “marginal states” “that struggle to obtain, maintain, or
consolidate the recognition and approval of world society,” and that Taiwan in particular has
responded to its diplomatic isolation “by adopting political and constitutional reforms that it knew
would win the approval of a clique of powerful nations”); Interview with Justice G, supra note 19
(observing that “we cite foreign cases” in part because “we are aware that what we do represents the
country and affects how we look”); Interview with Justice J, supra note 40 (explaining that Taiwan
hopes that democratization, respect for human rights, and being on the “frontline of the Freedom
House rankings” will enable it to become “less isolated”).
243. See Interview with Justice G, supra note 19 (noting that “how this makes us look
internationally” is “a more distant consideration” for the justices when they decide cases); Interview
with Justice J, supra note 40 (indicating that considerations of “global relations” and international
“legitimacy” are neither the “biggest” nor “most proximate” cause behind the TCC’s use of foreign
law).
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making up answers out of whole cloth to suit its own naked desires.244 In
other words, the practice of looking consistently to the same handful of
prestigious and influential countries for guidance may be perceived not
as a form of illicit judicial activism, but rather as a constraint upon
judicial discretion and thus a source of legitimacy for the TCC.
Perhaps the most proximate cause of foreign law usage by the TCC,
however, is the educational and professional background of the justices.
As previously noted, there is a strong correlation between where the
justices happen to be educated and which countries they look to for
guidance.245 In-depth questioning of the justices only confirmed the
importance of the relationship between judicial background and foreign
law usage. Nothing commanded stronger agreement among the justices
and clerks than the proposition that the justices’ predilection for foreign
law is shaped by their background. As one justice bluntly put it, “only
one thing makes a difference when it comes to use of foreign law: the
judge’s background.”246
Background, emphasized another justice, encompasses a variety of
elements, “including not only foreign education but personal upbringing,
family background, personal experience, who you normally come into
contact with.”247 But the two most important elements are where the
justices were educated, and what they did professionally prior to joining
the TCC.248 First, it is clear, both from the justices’ own accounts and
from empirical analysis of their opinions, that the justices tend to reach
for the body of foreign law that they know best on account of their own
training. As a result, German-trained justices and American-trained
justices may often find that they bring very different perspectives to the
same constitutional question.249 Not surprisingly, foreign training is also
said to influence the clerks in the same manner.250 Second, although it
may be true that career judges are “equally open-minded” to arguments

244. Interview with Justice J, supra note 40.
245. See supra Part III.F.
246. Interview with Justice D, supra note 109.
247. Interview with Justice C, supra note 124.
248. See, e.g., Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Justice B, supra note 114;
Interview with Justice C, supra note 124; Interview with Justice D, supra note 109; Interview with
Justice G, supra note 19.
249. Constitutional law scholars in Taiwan exhibit similar biases in favor of the countries where
they were trained. See Yeh Jiunn-Rong, Fa Lu Hsueh Men Cheng Chiu Ping Ku Yu Chan Wang
[Prospects and Evaluation of Development in Legal Academia], 27 KO HSUEH FA CHAN YUE KAN
[SCI. EDUC. MONTHLY] 607, 607–08 (1999) (Taiwan).
250. See Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101 (noting, for example, that while Americantrained clerks find the concept of a “public forum” in the context of freedom of expression to be
“totally basic,” German-trained clerks “don’t even think in terms of that concept”).
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based on foreign law—particularly when those arguments happen to suit
their own purposes251—the weight of both the qualitative and
quantitative evidence suggests that former academics make more
extensive and systematic use of foreign law.252 Thus, the fact that the
composition of the TCC is tilted sharply in favor of foreign-trained
academics is a recipe for extensive foreign law usage, and the fact that
most of them received their graduate legal training in Germany is, in
turn, an effective guarantee of German influence over Taiwanese
constitutional law.
There are at least two reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court, by
comparison, lags substantially in its use of foreign law, notwithstanding
its location at both the figurative and literal epicenter of J2J dialogue.
One explanation, which has received extensive scholarly attention,
would be that the Court feels at least somewhat chastened by the intense
criticism (and even direct threats253) that its recent forays into foreign
constitutional law have aroused. But another, no less important
explanation would be that the U.S. Supreme Court, unlike the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court, simply lacks the necessary institutional capacity to
learn about foreign law in anything approaching a routine and systematic
manner. There is no expectation or requirement, formal or informal, that
the Justices have prior experience with foreign law, and they typically
have no foreign legal training. The majority are not academics, much
less academics with graduate training in foreign law.254
251. Interview with Justice A, supra note 124; Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 156; see also
supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (contrasting the foreign law usage of justices who were
career judges with that of justices from academic backgrounds).
252. See, e.g., Interview with Justice A, supra note 124 (“[C]areer judges are just conservative:
they assume the law is constitutional and tend to seek evidence, including foreign law, that upholds
the law.”); Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 101 (observing that former academics are “more
systematic” in their use of foreign law and “more interested in the whole theory and doctrine” when
deciding what theory to adopt); Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 131 (observing that career judges
will consider foreign law but are ultimately “less interested in importing the theoretical
underpinnings of the doctrine, the whole system,” and “more interested in finding something that
supports the result” and thus are content to “maybe just borrow a couple of arguments from the
case”).
253. Law, supra note 1, at 656–57 (describing the impeachment threats and even death threats
made against certain Justices for referring to foreign law).
254. All three of the former academics on the Court as of this writing studied abroad over the
course of their formal educations, but none focused on law during their time abroad. Justices Breyer
and Kagan both hold degrees from Oxford, but not in law. See Stephen G. Breyer, FINDLAW,
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/justices/breyer.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2011)
(indicating that Justice Breyer studied economics at Magdalen College, Oxford); Elena Kagan, THE
OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org/justices/elena_kagan
(last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (indicating that Justice Kagan’s field of study at Worcester College,
Oxford, was philosophy). Justice Scalia spent his junior year as an undergraduate at the University
of Fribourg but focused on history, economics, and literature. See JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN
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Nor, unlike many other prominent constitutional courts, does the U.S.
Supreme Court even attempt to compensate for these deficiencies by
hiring clerks or researchers with the kind of training, experience, or even
language abilities, that might help fill the resulting knowledge gaps.255
As Vicki Jackson observes, there are a number of ways in which the
Court might acquire the capacity to learn about foreign law in a fair,
transparent, and accurate manner.256 For example, it could introduce new
briefing procedures that guarantee adequate and balanced participation
by a combination of court-appointed experts and knowledgeable amici
curiae.257 It might also hire foreign lawyers as clerks,258 or it could seek
more generally to ensure that it “has within its institutional apparatus
personnel with sufficient education and expertise to assist in research on
issues of foreign or international law.”259 Instead, however, the Court
makes do with the help of a combination of court and library personnel
and an obscure arm of the Library of Congress called the Directorate of

ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 25 (2009).
255. See, e.g., Ursula Bentele, Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s
Experience with Comparative Constitutional Law, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 244 (2009)
(noting that justices of the South African Constitutional Court “have the benefit of up to five clerks
selected from applicants around the world” in addition to two South African law clerks); Alexander
Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second Germanization of
American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284, 284 n.1 (1998) (describing the Israeli
Supreme Court as “the most important comparative constitutional law institute of the world,” and
attributing its prowess at comparative constitutional analysis in part to its “practice of employing
clerks from all over the world, who do the research work on their country of origin”); supra note 63
(discussing the practices of the “constitutional research officers” and foreign law specialists
employed by the South Korean Constitutional Court). Moreover, a court need not employ clerks or
justices who are literally foreign in order to enjoy an institutional capacity for learning about foreign
law. Although the Canadian Supreme Court does not make a point of hiring clerks from other
countries, it enjoys both an innate knowledge of, and capacity for learning about, foreign law that
the U.S. Supreme Court lacks. The unwritten rules governing the allocation of seats on the Canadian
court on the basis of geography guarantee that a sizeable portion of the justices are native
francophones with a civil law background. See F.L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter
Canada: A System in Transition, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 56, 70 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
So, too, are a sizeable fraction of the court’s clerks. The infrastructure for this legal and linguistic
diversification is both intellectual and historical: Canada’s law schools provide a combination of
common law and civil law training in a combination of English and French. See Aline Grenon &
Louis Perret, Globalization and Canadian Legal Education, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 549–52 (2002)
(describing how certain Canadian law schools ensure “direct access to Canada’s legal and linguistic
duality” by offering both civil law and common law instruction, in both official languages).
256. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 190–91.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 189.
259. Id. The Korean Constitutional Court is pursuing such a strategy to a dramatic extent by
establishing its own research institute to be staffed by scholars who are fluent in foreign languages.
See supra note 63.
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Legal Research.260
Above all, there are structural limits upon what the U.S. Supreme
Court can do to improve its own capacity for comparative analysis.
Institutional factors well beyond the Court’s control mean that there is
no meaningful pool of talent from which either potential clerks or
judicial candidates with substantial foreign legal expertise can be
recruited. The first such factor is the composition of the Court itself.
Unlike in Taiwan, there is no quota of seats on the Court that are
reserved for law professors with foreign legal training who are
inherently likely to make enthusiastic use of foreign law.
The second factor, which contributes to the first and defies easy
reform, is the structure of legal education in the United States. Whereas
basic legal training in Taiwan occurs at the undergraduate level, the fact
that law is exclusively a graduate subject in the United States makes it
less feasible for American lawyers to obtain formal training in foreign
law in addition to their obligatory training in domestic law. It is less
realistic to ask someone who already holds both undergraduate and law
degrees to obtain an additional degree in foreign law as a condition of
obtaining a clerkship than to ask someone who merely holds an
undergraduate degree in law. Nor is foreign legal training made more
attractive by the prospect of an academic job, as in Taiwan. Although
law school hiring of teaching candidates who hold both a J.D. and a
Ph.D. is accelerating, would-be law professors who obtained their law
degrees in the United States do not go overseas for their Ph.D.s, and
recent hiring trends offer little evidence that teaching candidates are
rewarded by the job market for having foreign legal training.261 The
dearth of such training on the part of the nation’s law professors,
meanwhile, tends to ensure that little knowledge of foreign law will be
imparted to the next generation of law clerks and judicial candidates.
Thus, to the extent that the U.S. Supreme Court appears parochial in its
choice of persuasive authorities, that parochialism can be traced back to
the manner in which American law schools hire today’s legal scholars
and train tomorrow’s law clerks and judges.
260. See id. at 189–91; Michael Ravnitzky, The Directorate of Legal Research at the Library of
Congress: A Treasure Hidden Under a Bushel Basket, LLRX.COM (Nov. 22, 2006),
http://www.llrx.com/features/lclegalresearch.htm (describing the Directorate of Legal Research as a
“research department contained within the Library of Congress” that “receives scant mention even
among the legal research community”).
261. See Entry Level Hiring Survey 2010, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/04/entry-level-hiring-survey-2010.html (listing the
educational credentials of those hired into tenure-track teaching positions at American law schools
in 2010); 2009 Entry Level Hiring Report, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 26, 2009),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/entry_level_hiring_report (doing the same for 2009).
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CONCLUSION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACADEMIC
PAROCHIALISM AND THE COST OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INFLUENCE
We do not dispute that globalization has had a profound impact on
the capacity of judges to interact across national borders and, indeed,
upon the development of constitutional law more generally. Nor do we
question the value of comparative analysis for constitutional courts
around the world that increasingly find themselves faced with similar
questions and equipped with similar analytical tools.262 It is both
conceptually inaccurate and empirically unwarranted, however, to
characterize the way in which constitutional courts currently use foreign
law as a form of “dialogue.” And it is also doubtful whether actual
dialogue of the literal, judge-to-judge variety has much impact on either
the frequency or sophistication with which constitutional courts actually
consider foreign law. As comparison of the Taiwanese Constitutional
Court and U.S. Supreme Court demonstrates, participation in global J2J
dialogue is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for meaningful
judicial usage of foreign law and cannot compensate for an array of
vastly more important institutional variables, such as the structure of
legal education and the qualifications for judicial office.
The manner in which constitutional comparativism has developed in
Taiwan holds distinct lessons for those who wish to see the U.S.
Supreme Court make greater and more sophisticated use of foreign law,
on the one hand, and those who fear the decline of American soft power
and wish to see the global influence of American constitutionalism
restored to its former glory, on the other.263 For those who might wish to
see the U.S. Supreme Court exhibit greater cosmopolitanism in its use of
persuasive authorities, jawboning its members or inviting them to
additional conferences and gatherings is likely to have little impact. The
supposed parochialism of the U.S. Supreme Court should not be
understood entirely, or even primarily, as a function of close-mindedness
or stubbornness on the part of the Justices. At this point in time, the
262. See Law, supra note 1, at 697–700 (characterizing balancing and means-end analysis as
inescapable and ubiquitous forms of “generic constitutional analysis”); see also ALEC STONE
SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 32–33 (2004) (identifying the “reason-giving”
requirement as a ubiquitous part of constitutional adjudication).
263. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution,
97
NYU
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
June
2012),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923556 (documenting the declining popularity of the United States
Constitution as a model for constitution-makers elsewhere); Liptak, supra note 1, at A1 (citing
evidence that American constitutional jurisprudence has become less influential in other countries,
and that the Supreme Court’s own aversion to considering foreign law may be partly to blame).
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greatest obstacle to a routine and sophisticated practice of judicial
comparativism in the United States is not the unwillingness of individual
judges to consider foreign legal materials. Within the last decade, no
fewer than six different Justices publicly voiced their support for
comparative constitutional analysis.264 As promising as such an
attitudinal shift might seem, however, there is a world of difference
between expressing support for comparative analysis in principle and
having the wherewithal to actually perform such analysis on more than a
sporadic, ad hoc basis.
It is, instead, the political economy of American legal training that
poses the greater obstacle to the emergence of robust judicial
comparativism. The fact that American judges and law clerks examine
foreign law far less frequently or thoroughly than their Taiwanese
counterparts is hardly surprising given how few of them possess foreign
legal training. To ensure an adequate supply of outstanding judges and
clerks with such training would, however, require a sea change in
American legal education. As long as American law school faculties
neither place a premium upon hiring legal scholars with comparative
training nor train their own students in foreign law, today’s law clerks
and tomorrow’s judges and law professors will neither seek nor possess
such training. American judges are not to be blamed if their own vision
ends at water’s edge. They are simply products of the system that
created them. The day that American law students prize a degree in
comparative law as a stepping stone to a Supreme Court clerkship or a
teaching position in an American law school will be the day that judicial
comparativism has become truly institutionalized.
For those concerned about the loss of American constitutional
influence overseas, the case of Taiwan suggests even greater reason for
despondency. Perhaps no country in the world is more dependent on the
United States for its security than this small, diplomatically isolated
island under constant threat from the world’s most populous country and
(for now) second-largest economy. There may be no country that values
its ties with the United States more highly. Yet Germany has far greater
influence over Taiwanese constitutional jurisprudence at this point than
does the United States. That influence reflects not simply the historical
origins of the Taiwanese legal system, but also Germany’s extensive and

264. Indeed, at least as of 2005, those Justices who had publicly announced or demonstrated their
support for the use of foreign and international legal materials as persuasive authority constituted a
solid majority of the Court. See Law, supra note 1, at 653–55 (citing the public pronouncements of
then-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer on
the use of foreign law).
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far-sighted investment in the education of foreign lawyers who will be
tomorrow’s foreign leaders.265
One could, of course, take a benign view of such developments.
Constitutional democracy with a German twist is still constitutional
democracy. Its spread serves only to advance democracy and the rule of
law and poses no discernible threat to American interests. If loss of
American constitutional influence in countries that are otherwise within
America’s sphere of influence is indeed cause for concern, however, an
easy and obvious solution suggests itself. Financial support for
American legal training of foreign academics and judges—not least of
all those in Taiwan who find themselves on the frontline of democracy
and constitutionalism in Asia—is both morally and strategically sound.
It is no coincidence that the one current member of the TCC with
American legal training is a former Fulbright scholar266—or, for that
matter, that the other eight former academics on the Court received
equivalent scholarships from Germany.267 A relatively small investment
in the noble cause of bolstering democratic institutions, and in a country
that happens to be a close American ally in an increasingly treacherous
region of the world, is likely to yield dividends and can do only good.

265. See Yeh, supra note 249, at 608 (noting the popularity of the German government-sponsored
DAAD scholarship among Taiwan’s subsequent law professors and justices).
266. See
Tzu-Yi
Lin,
JUSTICES
OF
THE
CONST.
CT.,
JUD.
YUAN,
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03_01.asp?curno=31 (last visited Sept. 21,
2011).
267. In the flush of its postwar economic success, Germany launched a generous academic
scholarship for which Taiwanese law students were eligible—namely, the Deutscher Akademischer
Austausch Dienst, or DAAD—at roughly the same time as the United States began to scale back its
economic and military aid to Taiwan. Most, if not all, of the German-trained law professors in
Taiwan have at some point received a DAAD scholarship. This German influence has, in turn, been
passed down from one generation to the next. One of the most important of these German-trained
justices, Weng Yueh-Sheng, who was appointed to the Constitutional Court in 1972 and served until
his retirement in 2007, obtained a Ph.D. from Heidelberg University with the support of a DAAD
scholarship and shaped an entire generation of legal academics through his part-time teaching at
National Taiwan University. See Yeh, supra note 249, at 607–08 (discussing the impact of the
German DAAD scholarship on legal education in Taiwan).

